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Abstract
This paper develops a simple model of international trade with intermediation. We consider
an economy with two islands and two types of agents, farmers and traders. Farmers can produce
two goods, but in order to sell these goods in centralized (Walrasian) markets, they need to be
matched with a trader, and this entails costly search. In the absence of search frictions, our
model reduces to a standard Ricardian model of trade. We use this simple model to contrast
the implications of changes in the integration of Walrasian markets, which allow traders from
di⁄erent islands to exchange their goods, and changes in the access to these Walrasian markets,
which allow farmers to trade with traders from di⁄erent islands. We ￿nd that intermediation
always magni￿es the gains from trade under the former type of integration, but leads to more
nuanced welfare results under the latter, including the possibility of aggregate losses.
￿We are grateful to Daron Acemoglu, Robert Barro, Federico D￿ez, Dave Donaldson, Gene Grossman, Elhanan
Helpman, Oleg Itskhoki, James Mirlees, Jim Rauch, and Jonathan Vogel for very useful conversations, and to three
anonoymous referees as as well as seminar participants at Toronto, Nottingham, Boston Fed, MIT, Paris School of
Economics, Zurich, Aut￿noma-Barcelona, ITAM, Colorado-Boulder, Harvard Business School, the NBER Summer
Institute, Oregon and Boston University for useful comments. Frank Schilbach provided excellent research assistance.
First Draft: October 27, 2009.1 Introduction
Intermediaries are the grease that allows the wheels of commerce to spin.1 From small itinerant
traders picking up co⁄ee in rural Uganda to large Asian trading companies matching Western
manufacturers with local suppliers of goods or services, intermediaries are instrumental in bringing
to life the gains from international exchange. Yet, these intermediaries are rarely viewed as the
unsung heroes of globalization. Instead, they are sometimes portrayed as villains that exploit
producers in less developed countries and siphon all gains from trade away from these economies
and towards developed countries (see, for instance, Oxfam, 2002).
What does the theory of international trade have to tell us about the role of these intermediaries?
Unfortunately, very little. Neoclassical trade theory assumes the existence of centralized markets
where homogeneous goods are exchanged at a common, market-clearing price. New trade theory
emphasizes product di⁄erentiation and monopolistic behavior within industries, but how supply
meets demand is again not speci￿ed in those models. The purpose of this paper is to develop a
stylized but explicit model of intermediation in trade, and to use this model to shed light on the
role of intermediaries in materializing the gains from international trade as well as in a⁄ecting the
distribution of these gains.
Our starting point is a simple Ricardian model with two geographically separated islands, North
and South, and two homogeneous goods, co⁄ee and sugar. Each island is populated by a continuum
of farmers who must decide, at any point in time, whether to grow co⁄ee or sugar. We depart from
the standard Ricardian model in assuming that farmers do not have direct access to centralized
(Walrasian) markets where goods can be costlessly exchanged. Instead, farmers need to resort to
traders to conduct these transactions on their behalf. Farmers￿trading opportunities arise randomly
at a rate determined by the ratio of traders to farmers seeking trades on each island at any point
in time. We refer to this ratio as the island￿ s level of intermediation. The number of traders active
on each island is itself endogenous and pinned down by a free-entry condition.
Unlike farmers, traders are assumed to have direct access to Walrasian markets where all trades
occur at a common, market-clearing relative price. Nevertheless, the terms of exchange between
farmers and traders di⁄er from those in the centralized market, since traders exploit the lock-in
e⁄ect created by search frictions to charge a positive margin to farmers and thereby recoup the costs
they incur when intermediating trade. We model the determination of prices in bilateral exchanges
as the outcome of a generalized Nash bargaining game between each farmer and the trader he or
she is matched with.
Using this simple theoretical framework we revisit the consequences of economic integration
when trade is intermediated. We let the two islands di⁄er in their available production technologies
1Though it is not straightforward to quantify the importance of intermediaries in market economies, the early work
of Wallis and North (1986) suggests that the size of the private ￿transaction sector￿was around 41% of U.S. GNP
in 1970. More recently, Spulber (1996a) provides a conservative estimate indicating that intermediation activities
account for about 25% of U.S. GDP. Such estimates are, of course, very sensitive to the de￿nition of ￿intermediation
activities.￿ In an internationcal context, Feenstra, Hanson and Lin (2004) estimate that, during the 1990s, Hong Kong
intermediated over ￿fty percent of the volume of China￿ s exports to the rest of the world.
1to grow co⁄ee and sugar, as well as in their ￿market institutions,￿which we model as exogenous
characteristics of the traders populating the two islands. More speci￿cally, we let Northern traders
be more e¢ cient than Southern traders in intermediating trade, and we also allow the primitive
bargaining power of Northern traders to be higher than that of Southern traders. For simplicity,
we further let the Northern island be large relative to the Southern one, so that we can (for the
most part) focus on the e⁄ects of integration for the Southern island and ignore the feedback e⁄ects
that this may have on the rest of the world.
How does one think about economic integration in a world economy where trading opportu-
nities are constrained by such market institutions? A ￿rst possibility is to consider the case in
which the centralized market where traders exchange goods becomes global rather than local, while
maintaining the assumption that farmers can only ￿nd trading opportunities with local traders.
Throughout the paper, we refer to this ￿rst type of integration￿ the integration of two initially
isolated Walrasian markets￿ as W-integration. Our model, however, also allows for a di⁄erent type
of integration involving the internationalization of trading opportunities, so that traders worldwide
are allowed to intermediate trade in either of the two islands. We refer to this second type of
integration￿ the integration of two initially isolated matching markets￿ as M-integration. Broadly
speaking, W-integration aims to shed light on the consequences of convergence in goods prices across
countries in the presence of intermediaries, while M-integration, which is more closely related to
foreign direct investment, seeks to capture the consequences of the entry of foreign intermediaries
in local markets, regardless of whether such intermediaries are trading companies, banks, or multi-
national companies in practice.
The ￿rst type of integration is analogous to the one considered by standard trade models.
Since our economy features domestic distortions associated with the bilateral exchanges between
farmers and traders, one might have anticipated the possibility of W-integration having ambiguous
welfare e⁄ects; see e.g., Bhagwati (1971). Our ￿rst result demonstrates that this is not the case:
W-integration generates Pareto gains from trade, just as in the standard Ricardian model. This
is true regardless of the parameters governing market institutions in the two islands. Rather
than aggravating distortions, we show that the endogeneity of intermediation necessarily magni￿es
the aggregate gains from trade and reduces the margins charged by traders. The integration of
Walrasian markets increases the level of intermediation in the South, which generates growth along
the transition path towards the new steady state. Furthermore, under mild regularity conditions,
this growth e⁄ect is larger in economies with lower levels of intermediation under autarky, thereby
leading to convergence across countries.
By contrast, our analysis of the e⁄ects of M-integration produces much more nuanced results.
The relatively higher pro￿tability of Northern traders (due to their lower intermediation costs and
higher bargaining power) allows them to penetrate the Southern island and intermediate trade
there. Such process of entry naturally leads to an increase in the level of intermediation and output
growth in the South over and above the one brought about by W-integration. Nevertheless, the
higher bargaining power of Northern traders now implies an ambiguous e⁄ect of M-integration
2on intermediation margins. Accordingly, social welfare in South may go up or down following
M-integration, despite its positive e⁄ect on output. When the (primitive) bargaining strength
of traders is similar across islands and the costs of intermediation di⁄er signi￿cantly, then M-
integration is necessarily associated with an increase in social welfare in South that is in excess of
the aforementioned gains from W-integration. Intuitively, M-integration improves the technology
of intermediation in South with no adverse distributional consequences.
Conversely, when the (primitive) bargaining power of traders is disproportionately large in the
North and the costs of intermediation are similar across islands, then M-integration may decrease
social welfare in South. The reduction in Southern welfare occurs when the primitive bargaining
power of traders is large relative to certain parameters governing search frictions. In those situa-
tions, even though Southern farmers (and the South as a whole) would be better o⁄if farmers could
collectively commit to refuse any trade with Northern traders, each individual Southern farmer has
an incentive to deviate from this cooperative equilibrium and accept trades with Northern traders.
Importantly, this is true ex-post (once a trading opportunity with a Northern trader arises) as
well as ex-ante (when a farmer decides whether to actively seek trades with Northern agents or
not). The key behind this ￿prisoner￿ s dilemma￿situation and the implied possibility of aggregate
losses from trade is the trading externality underlying the search friction in goods markets. In this
environment, the bilateral negotiations between a trader and a farmer not only a⁄ect the division
of surplus among these two agents, but also a⁄ect the entry of traders and thus the rate at which
trading possibilities arise for farmers that have not yet found a match. However, farmers and
traders only bargain after they have found a match and thus their negotiations fail to internalize
this externality. We ￿nd that a necessary (though not su¢ cient) condition for there to be aggregate
losses from M-integration in South is for the margins charged by Northern traders to be larger than
those charged by Southern traders before M-integration.
At this point, it may appear that our model captures some popular concerns regarding inter-
mediaries. In particular, losses from trade seem to be associated with the ￿marginalization￿ of
Southern producers (in the sense that they only ￿nd trading opportunities at a limited rate), and
with the fact that Northern traders charge exceedingly high margins for intermediating trade. A
few observations are however in order. First, and most obviously, our model only demonstrates
the possibility of aggregate losses, and at the same time it illustrates that integration can be a
powerful mechanism to lift economies with weak levels of intermediation out of poverty. Second, in
our model, in situations in which M-integration reduces welfare in the South, it also reduces welfare
in the world because, by free entry, the (large) North is una⁄ected by M-integration. Hence, our
model does not suggest that M-integration will amount to a transfer of surplus from the South to
the North.2 Third, our model is perfectly consistent with the South bene￿tting from M-integration
2It is worth pointing out that this observation crucially relies on the fact that we are comparing convergent paths
rather than steady states (c.f., Diamond, 1980). In Section 5, we also brie￿ y discuss the case where South is no longer
small compared to North. In this situation, M-integration tends to increase welfare in the North while reducing it in
the South. The mechanism at play, however, is a standard general equilibrium terms-of-trade e⁄ect. By improving
the intermediation technology in the South, M-integration increases the relative supply of Southern goods, and in
turn, worsens its terms of trade.
3while at the same time Northern traders￿margins being higher than those charged by Southern
traders before M-integration. In our model, we show that a su¢ cient statistic for welfare analysis
is the margin charged by Southern (rather than Northern) traders before and after M-integration.
Our model of intermediation is admittedly stylized and does not aspire to capture the precise
workings of any particular market. The search frictions in our model merely aim to re￿ ect, in a some-
what reduced-form way, the set of frictions that inhibit the ability of producers to costlessly place
their goods in world markets, whether such frictions actually derive from time-consuming search,
from incomplete information about quality or prices, or from working-capital needs. Nonetheless,
readers insisting on a literal interpretation of our framework may ￿nd our simple model particularly
useful in analyzing the role of itinerant traders in certain agricultural markets in Africa. In Uganda,
for instance, where co⁄ee represents close to one quarter of total exports, 85% of Robusta co⁄ee
farmers sell to itinerant traders despite the existence of nearby centralized markets; see Fafchamps
and Hill (2005). This phenomenon has been deemed important for understanding how the welfare
gains associated with terms-of-trade improvements are distributed between farmers and interme-
diaries (see Fafchamps and Hill, 2008). Furthermore, there is evidence that trading externalities
of the type formalized by our model may be key in the determination of the welfare implications
of these terms-of-trade movements (see Fafchamps and Hill, 2008). In this context, one can also
think of the signi￿cant presence of foreign ￿rms in co⁄ee production in Uganda as a real-world
counterpart to M-integration in our model.3
We believe, however, that our approach of using dynamic bargaining and matching techniques
to model international transactions has wider applicability and can be used more generally to
shed light on other empirically relevant forms of intermediation, particularly in manufacturing
processes. To illustrate that point, our ￿nal section presents a series of extensions that incorporate
more realistic features of intermediation. Our ￿rst extension allows Northern trading companies
to be larger than Southern ones and, in particular, to transact with more than one producer. This
extension provides a simple microfoundation for our assumption that Northern traders have a higher
bargaining power than Southern ones, and also illustrates that welfare losses may be associated
with the entry of ine¢ ciently large Northern trading companies. Our second extension considers
a variant of our framework in which traders are in ￿xed supply, perhaps because of government
regulations, and thus earn rents, whereas the number of producers is endogenously determined by
their choices between ￿market￿ and ￿non-market￿ activities. While some predictions regarding
the e⁄ect of integration on margins are sensitive to this modi￿cation, our main welfare results are
robust to this alternative formulation. Our third extension allows the number of producers and
traders to be endogenously determined via occupational choice decisions. Quite naturally, some of
the distributional consequences of W- and M-integration are a⁄ected by this modi￿cation of our
original model. Interestingly, however, we continue to ￿nd that W-integration makes all agents
(weakly) better o⁄, while M-integration can still create winners and losers and may well decrease
3For example, the Kaweri co⁄ee plantation, which is Uganda￿ s largest co⁄ee farm, is owned by the Neumann
Ka⁄ee Gruppe based in Hamburg, Germany.
4aggregate welfare. We conclude this section by brie￿ y describing three further variants of our model
that highlight the implications of intersectoral mobility and producer heterogeneity.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, we draw some ideas from a small
literature that has studied the emergence and characteristics of intermediaries in closed-economy
(and mostly partial-equilibrium) models. Important early contributions to this literature include
the work of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Biglaiser (1993), and Spulber (1996b). As in Ru-
binstein and Wolinsky (1987), we also emphasize the importance of search frictions in determining
the margins charged by intermediaries, though we do so in a general equilibrium, open-economy
setup.4 In terms of the structure of our model, we borrow some tools from the sizeable literature
on search-theoretic approaches to the analysis of labor markets, which builds on the seminal pa-
pers by Diamond (1982) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).5 In that respect, the ine¢ ciency
underlying our non-standard welfare results bears a close relationship to Hosios￿(1990a) analysis of
the e¢ ciency of labor market equilibria. Search-theoretic models have been applied to the study of
international trade issues before, but with very di⁄erent goals in mind. For instance, Davidson et
al. (1988, 1999) and Hosios (1990b) study the workings of two-sector, general equilibrium models
featuring asymmetric search frictions in the two sectors, and revisit the determination of compar-
ative advantage and the e⁄ects of trade integration on labor market outcomes (see also Costinot,
2009, and Helpman et al., 2009). Instead, search frictions are symmetric in the two sectors in our
model.6
In terms of focus, our paper is more closely related to a recent, burgeoning literature on the role
of intermediaries in world trade. On the empirical side, this literature builds on the insights of Rauch
(2001), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), and Feenstra and Hanson (2004) about the importance
of intermediation and networks in determining the e⁄ective costs of conducting international trade
across countries.7 More recent approaches have used ￿rm-level data to shed further light on the
factors that drive a ￿rm to seek the help of an intermediary when engaging in international trade
(see, for instance, Ahn et al., 2009, Blum et al., 2009, Akerman, 2010, or Bernard et al., 2010).
It has been documented, for instance, that relatively unproductive exporters are more likely to
resort to intermediaries than relatively productive exporters. As we show in section 6, a simple
extension of our model that introduces producer heterogeneity delivers predictions consistent with
these empirical studies.
While some of these contributions o⁄er simple models to motivate the empirical analysis, the
4This aspect of our analysis also is related to the work of Du¢ e et al. (2005) who study how the bid and ask
prices charged by marketmakers in over-the-counter markets are shaped by search frictions.
5See Pissarides (2000) for an overview of the early contributions to this literature and Rogerson et al. (2005) for
an account of more recent developments.
6More recently, Eaton et al. (2010) have used a dynamic model of search and learning to rationalize the observed
export dynamics of Colombian ￿rms.
7Morriset (1998) studies the role of intermediaries margins in shaping the gap between the retail price of seven
major commodities and the price obtained by the producers of these commodities. McMillan et al. (2003) also
argue that these intermediation margins are important for understanding the small recorded welfare gains from trade
liberalization of the cashew sector in Mozambique. Hummels et al. (2009) o⁄er evidence of price discrimination in
the shipping industry. See Stahl (1988) for an early, simple model of market power in international trading, and Eckel
(2009) and Ra⁄ and Schmitt (2009) for more recent contributions featuring market power in wholesaling or retailing.
5modeling of intermediaries tends to focus on technological di⁄erences across ￿rms and on their
implications for cross-sectional predictions (at the ￿rm- or industry-level). Instead, we develop
a general equilibrium model where the rationale for intermediaries and the margins they charge
stems from search frictions. By explicitly modeling market institutions we are able to draw welfare
implications for the e⁄ects of integration in a world in which middlemen intermediate trade. In
that respect, our work is most closely related to the earlier work of Rauch and Watson (2004) and
recent working papers by Bardhan et al. (2009) and Chau et al. (2009), who develop complementary
theories of intermediation. Our work is however distinct in three key dimensions. First, our model
is built as a strict generalization of a standard Ricardian model of trade: when intermediation
costs go to zero, traders￿margins vanish, and the equilibrium is analogous to that of the standard
model. Second, we develop a dynamic framework where traders￿margins are shaped by both the
current and future trading opportunities of farmers. Finally, we depart from these previous authors
in studying the welfare consequences of two distinct types of economic integration.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic environment. Section
3 characterizes the equilibrium under autarky. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the consequences of W-
and M-integration, respectively. Section 6 discusses several extensions and variants of our model.
Section 7 o⁄ers some concluding remarks. All proofs can be found in the appendix or in the online
addendum.
2 The Basic Environment
Consider an island inhabited by a continuum of in￿nitely lived agents consuming two goods, co⁄ee
(C) and sugar (S). An exogenous measure NF of the island inhabitants are engaged in production.9
We refer to this set of agents as farmers and assume that they (and only they) have access to
production technologies that allow them to produce an amount 1=aC of co⁄ee or an amount 1=aS
of sugar per unit of time. A farmer cannot produce both goods at the same date t and goods are
not storable. We denote by ￿ 2 [0;1] the share of co⁄ee farmers at a given date. For notational
convenience, we drop time indices from all our variables whenever there is no risk of confusion.
Our main point of departure from the classical Ricardian model is that farmers do not have direct
access to Walrasian markets where their output can be exchanged for that of other farmers. In order
to be able to sell part of their output and consume both goods, a farmer needs to ￿nd a trader, and
doing so may take time as described below. Traders do not spend any time engaged in production
but have access to Walrasian markets in which both goods are exchanged competitively. We denote
by p ￿ pC=pS the relative price of co⁄ee in this Walrasian market. Somewhat allegorically, we
envision a situation in which, at each date, traders (and only they) are informed about the location
on the island where trade can take place.10
8Bardhan et al. (2009) also consider two types of economic integration (trade and o⁄shoring) but their focus is
on their e⁄ect on income inequality.
9Throughout this paper, we will slightly abuse terminology and equivalently speak about the ￿measure￿and the
￿number￿of agents of a given type.
10With this stark assumption we seek to capture the basic notion that, through their informational advantage,
6The pool of potential traders on the island is large. At any point in time, potential traders can
become active or inactive. In order to remain connected to Walrasian markets, an active trader
must incur an intermediation cost equal to ￿ at each date, but stands to obtain some remuneration
when intermediating a trade for a farmer. By contrast, inactive traders are involved in an activity
that generates no income but also no disutility of e⁄ort, e.g., laying in a hammock.11 We assume
that the pool of potential traders is large enough to ensure that the measure of traders operating
on the island, NT, is not constrained by population size and some agents are always laying in
hammocks. Hence, in equilibrium, NT will be endogenously pinned down by free entry.
All agents aim to maximize the expected value of their lifetime utility12
V = E
￿Z +1
0
e￿rt [v (C(t);S(t)) ￿ IA (t)￿]dt
￿
,
where r > 0 is the common discount factor; IA (t) = 1 if the agent is an active trader at date
t and IA (t) = 0 otherwise; C (t) ￿ 0 and S (t) ￿ 0 are the consumption of good C and S at
date t, respectively; and v is increasing, concave, homogeneous of degree one and satis￿es the
two Inada conditions: limC!0 vC = limS!0 vS = +1 and limC!+1 vC = limS!+1 vS = 0. The
assumption that the utility function v is homogeneous of degree one guarantees that agents are
risk neutral. Combined with the Inada conditions, it also implies that both goods are essential:
v (0;S) = v (C;0) = 0 for all C and S.
The process through which farmers ￿nd traders involves search frictions and one-to-one match-
ing. Farmers and traders can be in two states, matched (M) or unmatched (U). We denote by uF
and uT the mass of unmatched farmers and traders at any point in time. Unmatched farmers and
traders come together randomly. The number of matches per unit of time is given by a matching
function, m(uF;uT), which is increasing, concave, homogeneous of degree one and satis￿es the two
Inada conditions: limuF!0 muF = limuT!0 muT = +1 and limuF!+1 muF = limuT!+1 muT = 0.
The associated (Poisson) rate at which unmatched farmers meet unmatched traders is equal to
￿F (￿) ￿ m(1;￿), with ￿ ￿ uT=uF. Similarly, the rate at which unmatched traders meet un-
matched farmers is given by ￿T (￿) ￿ m(1=￿;1) = ￿F (￿)=￿. The variable ￿ is a su¢ cient statistic
for the matching rates of both agents, which we refer to as the level of ￿intermediation￿on the
island. We also assume that existing matches are destroyed at an exogenous Poisson rate ￿ > 0.
When a farmer and a trader form a match, they negotiate the terms of exchange of the output
in the hands of the farmer. Although the trader has access to a Walrasian market where co⁄ee
and sugar are exchanged at a relative price p, the bilateral terms of trade will depart from this
competitive price and will re￿ ect the (primitive) bargaining power of agents as well as their outside
specialized traders can facilitate producers￿access to potential buyers. One can think of the provision of quality
guarantees or trade credit as alternative means by which intermediaries perform the same function in the real world.
11Dick Cooper and Avinash Dixit have both suggested that the alternative expression ￿lying in a hammock￿would
be less prone to venereal connotations. Our model is however robust to inactive traders laying in hammocks in pairs
and enjoying a positive utility ￿ ow from doing so.
12We model traders as economic agents with preferences represented by the utility function V . The equilibrium
would be essentially identical if we were to model traders as pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms.
7options. Rather than explicitly modeling these negotiations through an extensive form game, we
simply posit that generalized Nash bargaining leaves traders with a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of the ex-
post gains from trade (with the latter naturally depending on outside opportunities). Both parties
observe the type of good that the farmer carries, so bargaining occurs under complete information.
Let V M
Fi denote the value function of a farmer matched with a trader and producing good i = C;S;
and let V U
F denote the value function of an unmatched farmer.13 Similarly, let V M
Ti denote the value
function of a trader matched with a farmer carrying good i; and V U
T denote the value function of
an unmatched trader. Formally, the Nash bargaining consumption levels of a farmer-trader match
with good i, (CFi;SFi;CTi;STi), solve
max
CFi;SFi;CTi;STi
￿
V M
Ti ￿ V U
T
￿￿ ￿
V M
Fi ￿ V U
F
￿1￿￿
s.t. pCFi + SFi + pCTi + STi ￿ (p=aC) ￿ IC + (1=aS)(1 ￿ IC);
where IC = 1 if the farmer carries co⁄ee and IC = 0, otherwise. As we shall see, the implicit bilateral
relative price at which goods are exchanged can easily be retrieved from these consumption levels.
Each date t is divided into three periods. First, farmers decide which goods to produce. Second,
matched farmers and traders bargain over the exchange of goods. Finally, matched traders carry
out transactions in Walrasian markets, consumption takes place, new matches are formed among
unmatched agents, and a fraction of existing matches is dissolved exogenously.
3 Autarky Equilibrium
3.1 De￿nition
We de￿ne the equilibrium at any point in time of an isolated island of the type described above as:
(i) a relative price, p; (ii) a measure of traders, NT; (iii) a share of co⁄ee farmers, ￿; (iv) a vector
of consumption levels, (CFi;SFi;CTi;STi) for i = C;S; and (v) measures of unmatched farmers and
traders, uF and uT, such that: (i) agents choose their occupations to maximize their utility; (ii)
consumption levels are determined by Nash bargaining; (iii) matches are created and destroyed
according to the aforementioned Poisson process; and (iv) Walrasian markets clear.
3.2 Equilibrium Conditions
In order to understand the occupational choice decisions of agents, we need to describe how expected
lifetime utilities,
￿
V M
Fi ;V U
F ;V M
Ti ;V U
T
￿
for i = C;S, are determined. These value functions must
13Given that both goods are essential in consumption, it is clearly the case that unmatched farmers will attain the
same welfare level when unemployed, independently of the good they produce. For notational convenience, we thus
simply write V
U
FC = V
U
FS ￿ V
U
F :
8satisfy the following Bellman equations:
rV U
F = ￿F (￿)
￿
max
￿
V M
FC;V M
FS
￿
￿ V U
F
￿
+ _ V U
F , (1)
rV M
Fi = v(CFi;SFi) + ￿
￿
V U
F ￿ V M
Fi
￿
+ _ V M
Fi , (2)
rV U
T = ￿￿ + ￿T (￿)
￿
￿
￿
V M
TC ￿ V U
T
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
V M
TS ￿ V U
T
￿￿
+ _ V U
T , (3)
rV M
Ti = v(CTi;STi) ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
V U
T ￿ V M
Ti
￿
+ _ V M
Ti . (4)
Equations (1) and (2) re￿ ect the fact that unmatched farmers get zero instantaneous utility and
become matched at rate ￿F (￿) (at which point they obtain a gain of max
n
V M
FC;V M
FS
o
￿ V U
Fi)
whereas matched farmers with good i get utility v(CFi;SFi) and become unmatched at rate ￿ (at
which point they incur a loss of V M
Fi ￿ V U
F ). Both equations incorporate a potential capital gain
or loss of remaining in the farmer￿ s current state ( _ V U
Fi, _ V M
Fi ). Equations (3) and (4) are derived
similarly and follow from the fact that unmatched traders are subject to an intermediation cost ￿
and get matched to a co⁄ee farmer with probability ￿￿T (￿) and to a sugar farmer with probability
(1 ￿ ￿)￿T (￿), whereas traders matched with a farmer carrying good i = C;S get instantaneous
utility v(CTi;STi) ￿ ￿ and become unmatched at rate ￿.14
We can now describe how the process of intermediation and Nash bargaining between farmers
and traders a⁄ect the division of surplus and the implied terms of exchange of goods C and S. As
we formally show in the Appendix, Nash bargaining between farmers and traders implies that, at
any point in time,
V M
Ti ￿ V U
T = ￿
￿
V M
Ti + V M
Fi ￿ V U
T ￿ V U
F
￿
(5)
as well as
vC(CFi;SFi)
vS(CFi;SFi)
=
vC(CTi;STi)
vS(CTi;STi)
= p (6)
and
p ￿ Ci + ￿ Si = (p=aC) ￿ IC + (1=aS)(1 ￿ IC), (7)
where ￿ Ci ￿ CFi + CTi and ￿ Si ￿ SFi + STi denote the joint consumption of co⁄ee and sugar by
each farmer-trader match producing good i = C;S, respectively. Equation (5) simply states that
traders get a share ￿ of the surplus of any match, while equations (6) and (7) re￿ ect the fact that
Nash bargaining outcomes are Pareto e¢ cient.
Equilibrium in the island also requires that the Walrasian markets for co⁄ee and sugar clear at
any point in time. This in turn requires that
￿ ￿ CC + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ CS = ￿=aC, (8)
￿ ￿ SC + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ SS = (1 ￿ ￿)=aS, (9)
14For expositional purposes, we have chosen to write our Bellman equations under the implicit assumption that
matched farmers never switch from co⁄ee to sugar production and vice versa. This is innocuous in the autarky
equilibrium. Of course, at the (unexpected) time of W- and M-integration, matched farmers will be allowed to switch
sectors, as assumed in Section 2.
9These two equations simply equate average consumption of each good by each matched pair to
the average production of this good among matched pairs participating in the Walrasian market.
Note that Walras￿law still holds in this environment: because of Equation (7), one of the two
market-clearing conditions is redundant.
The last set of equilibrium conditions relate to the evolution of the measure of matched and
unmatched farmers and traders in the island. Free entry into the trading activity ensures that the
expected utility of an unmatched trader exactly equals the expected utility of an inactive trader at
all points in time, that is,
V U
T = 0. (10)
Finally, matching frictions imply that the measure of unmatched farmers uF evolves according to
the following law of motion:
_ uF = ￿(NF ￿ uF) ￿ ￿F (￿)uF. (11)
The ￿rst term in the right-hand-side corresponds to the measure of farmers entering the unmatched
state through exogenous separations, while the second term is the measure of farmers ￿nding a
match at a given point in time. The overall measure of active traders can then be determined by
the fact that the measure of matched traders must be equal to the measure of matched farmers at
any point in time:
NF ￿ uF = NT ￿ uT. (12)
3.3 Characterization, Existence, and Uniqueness
We next brie￿ y characterize some key features of the autarkic equilibrium and outline a proof of
its existence and uniqueness, with most technical details being relegated to the Appendix.
Because farmers are free to choose which good to produce at any point in time, it must be the
case that V M
FC = V M
FS ￿ V M
F at all times if both goods are produced in the autarkic equilibrium,
which is ensured by our Inada conditions. Equation (5) then directly implies V M
TC = V M
TS ￿ V M
T
at all times. Combining this observation with equations (2) and (6), we obtain (CFC;SFC) =
(CFS;SFS) ￿ (CF;SF). Similarly, equations (4) and (6) imply (CTC;STC) = (CTS;STS) ￿ (CT;ST).
In words, farmers should attain the same utility level when matched regardless of which good they
carry, which in turn implies that traders are also indi⁄erent as to the type of farmer that they get
matched with.
Armed with the previous equilibrium conditions, it is easy to characterize the relative price, p,
the share of co⁄ee farmers, ￿, and the total consumption among matched pairs, ￿ C ￿ ￿ CC = ￿ CS and
￿ S ￿ ￿ SC = ￿ SS, which are all determined in the Walrasian market. Since consumption levels are
identical for both types of farmer-trader match, equation (7) implies that the only relative price p
of co⁄ee consistent with equilibrium is
p = aC=aS. (13)
Note that p is time-invariant and identical to the relative price that would apply in a frictionless
10Ricardian model in which farmers had direct access to Walrasian markets. Intuitively, search
frictions create a wedge between competitive prices and those prevailing in bilateral exchanges
and thus a⁄ect the distribution of income between farmers and traders, but these frictions have a
symmetric e⁄ect on both sectors, and thus do not distort the relative supply or demand for co⁄ee or
sugar. Similarly, because farmers and traders have identical homothetic preferences, equations (6),
(8), and (9) imply that the share of farmers producing co⁄ee is also time invariant and una⁄ected
by search frictions, and is given by
￿
1 ￿ ￿
=
aC
aS
 
￿
aC
aS
￿
, (14)
where   (￿) ￿ [vC(￿;1)/vS(￿;1)]
￿1 is the relative demand for co⁄ee. Combining this expression with
(8), and (9), we can obtain the total consumption of co⁄ee and sugar among matched pairs:
￿ C =
 
￿
aC
aS
￿
aS + aC 
￿
aC
aS
￿, (15)
￿ S =
1
aS + aC 
￿
aC
aS
￿. (16)
The joint instantaneous utility enjoyed by a matched farmer-trader pair is thus given by v
￿ ￿ C; ￿ S
￿
￿￿
and is time invariant. Because the function v (￿) is homogeneous of degree one, it is also necessarily
the case that v (￿) is proportional to the value of the farmer￿ s good in the Walrasian market (i.e.,
the joint spending of the matched pair). In the rest of the paper, we slightly abuse notation and
denote by v (p) ￿ v
￿ ￿ C; ￿ S
￿
the joint utility level (net of e⁄ort costs) of a matched farmer-trader
pair when the relative price of co⁄ee is equal to p.
We next turn to a discussion of the terms of trade in bilateral exchanges, which is at the heart
of our analysis. Throughout the paper, we will denote by ￿ 2 (0;1) the share of joint consumption
￿ C and ￿ S that is captured by the trader, with the remaining share 1 ￿ ￿ accruing to the farmer.
Equation (6) ensures that this share is common for both goods. Naturally, a higher ￿ is associated
with a distribution of surplus that is more favorable to the trader. As shown in the Appendix,
equations (1)-(5) imply that at all points in time in the autarky equilibrium, the share ￿ is given
by
￿ = ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)￿
v (p)
. (17)
Not surprisingly, the previous expression states that the share ￿ of goods captured by the trader is
decreasing in the ratio ￿ of unmatched traders to unmatched farmers. Straightforward manipulation
of equation (17) also demonstrates that, for a given value of ￿, ￿ is necessarily increasing in the
primitive bargaining power ￿.
The value of ￿ can be interpreted as the ￿traders￿margins￿ , that is, the (percentage) di⁄erence
between the world relative price, p, and the e⁄ective relative price at which a farmer sells his
11or her good to a trader, pbid. To see this formally, note that the instantaneous utility function
v is homogenous of degree 1. Thus the farmer obtains an instantaneous utility level equal to
(1 ￿ ￿)v (p), and his or her consumption choices are as if the farmer￿ s income ￿and thus the price
at which the trader buys co⁄ee ￿had been reduced by a factor 1￿￿. We can hence conclude that
the traders￿(percentage) margin is equal to
￿
p ￿ pbid￿￿
p = ￿ > 0. So without risk of confusion,
we will simply refer to ￿ as the traders￿margins.
Having discussed the determination of prices in our model, we next move to characterizing the
dynamics of the level of intermediation, the value functions, and the measures of matched and
unmatched traders and farmers on the island. Using the free entry condition (10), which of course
implies _ V U
T = 0, we can rearrange equation (3) as
V M
T =
￿
￿T (￿)
. (18)
Equation (18) simply states that the present discounted utility of a matched trader should be
equal to the present discounted utility cost of remaining active while searching for a match. It
implicitly de￿nes the level of intermediation ￿ as an increasing function of the value function V M
T ,
￿ ￿ ^ ￿
￿
V M
T
￿
. In order to characterize the dynamics of the level of intermediation, we can therefore
focus on the dynamics of V M
T . Combining the Bellman equation of matched traders (4) with the
free entry condition (10) and the Nash bargaining outcome (17), we obtain
_ V M
T = (r + ￿)V M
T + (1 ￿ ￿)^ ￿
￿
V M
T
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ [v (p) ￿ ￿] (19)
Since we know that ^ ￿
0 ￿
V M
T
￿
> 0 by (18), we can conclude that the dynamics of V M
T in (19) are
unstable. For the expected lifetime utility of a matched trader to remain ￿nite we therefore need
_ V M
T = 0, which further implies _ ￿ = _ ￿ = 0. Using the fact that _ V M
T = 0 with equations (18) and
(19), the equilibrium level of intermediation ￿ can then be expressed, at any point in time, as the
implicit solution of
v (p) ￿ ￿
￿
=
r + ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
￿￿T (￿)
. (20)
Note that the right-hand side is an increasing function of ￿. Thus intermediation is higher in
economies with higher surplus levels v (p), lower intermediation costs ￿, and higher primitive bar-
gaining power of traders, ￿. When the cost of intermediation ￿ goes to 0, the level of ￿ implicit in
equation (20) goes to +1 and ￿ goes to 0, hence implying that farmers capture all the surplus,
just as in a standard Ricardian model.
Because ￿ is time-invariant, V U
F and V M
F now are the solution of a linear system of ODE,
equations (1) and (2). Since the eigenvalues of that system are both strictly positive, we must also
have _ V U
F = _ V M
F = 0 in equilibrium. In other words, all value functions must immediately jump to
their steady state values and remain constant thereafter. Combining equations (1), (2), (17), and
12(20) we obtain at any point in time
rV U
F =
￿F (￿)(1 ￿ ￿)v (p)
r + ￿ + ￿￿T (￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
, (21)
rV M
F =
[r + ￿F (￿)](1 ￿ ￿)v(p)
r + ￿ + ￿￿T (￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
. (22)
By contrast, the dynamics of uF in equation (11) are globally stable and uF slowly converges to its
steady state value given by
uF =
￿
￿ + ￿F (￿)
NF. (23)
Once the dynamics of uF are known, the dynamics of uT and NT can be computed using the
de￿nition of ￿ = uT=uF and equation (12). Since ￿ is a ￿jump￿variable, both uT and NT must
jump as well in order to ensure that equation (20) holds at any point in time. In the steady-state,
we have
uT =
￿￿
￿ + ￿F (￿)
NF, (24)
NT =
￿￿ + ￿F (￿)
￿ + ￿F (￿)
NF. (25)
As shown in the Appendix, the right-hand-side of this last equation is increasing in ￿ and hence,
the steady-state measure of traders NT is higher in economies with better production technologies,
lower intermediation costs ￿ and higher bargaining power ￿ of traders.
The previous discussion has demonstrated, by construction, the existence and uniqueness of
an autarkic equilibrium. It has also characterized some of its key features, as summarized in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 An autarkic equilibrium exists and is unique. The relative price of co⁄ee, p, the
share of co⁄ee farmers, ￿, the vector of consumption levels, (CF;SF;CT;ST), and the level of
intermediation, ￿, are constant over time and determined by equations (13)-(17) and (20). Similarly,
the lifetime utilities of all agents are time-invariant and given by equations (10), (18), (21), and
(22). By contrast, the measures of matched and unmatched farmers and traders slowly converge to
their steady-state value, equations (23)-(25).
4 Integration of Walrasian Markets
4.1 Assumptions
In the rest of this paper, we assume that the island described in section 2, which we now refer
to as ￿South￿ , opens up to trade with another island, which we call ￿North￿ . As in a standard
Ricardian model, the two islands di⁄er in the production technologies these farmers have access to.
To ￿x ideas, we assume that South has a comparative advantage in co⁄ee, so that aC=aS < a￿
C=a￿
S,
13where asterisks denote variables related to the Northern island. In addition to these technological
di⁄erences, we allow the Southern and the Northern island to di⁄er in terms of their ￿market
institutions￿by which we mean: (i) their intermediation costs, ￿ and ￿￿; and (ii) the primitive
bargaining power of their traders, ￿ and ￿￿. Finally, we assume that the measure of Southern
farmers, NF, is (in￿nitely) small compared to the measure of Northern farmers, N￿
F. Thus the
Southern island can be viewed as a small open economy.
Throughout this section, we focus on a situation in which farmers are only able to meet traders
from their own island, as in section 2, but traders from both islands now have access to a common
Walrasian market (located, at each date, in one of many possible desert islands). This is the
situation which we refer to as W-integration. Our goal is to analyze how (unexpected) W-integration
a⁄ects the levels of intermediation, production, and welfare in the Southern island.15
4.2 Equilibrium Conditions
Since the Northern island is large compared to the Southern island, the relative price of co⁄ee under
W-integration, pW, must be equal to the Northern autarky relative price:
pW = a￿
C=a￿
S.
By assumption, we know that pW = a￿
C=a￿
S > aC=aS. Hence Southern traders are able to exchange
co⁄ee at a higher relative price under W-integration than under autarky. The income of matched
farmer-trader pairs is therefore strictly higher if they produce co⁄ee rather than sugar; see equation
(7). As a result, all Southern farmers will immediately specialize in co⁄ee production, which will
raise the indirect utility of all matched farmer-trader pairs from v (p) to v
￿
pW￿
> v (p). The
mechanism is the same as in a standard Ricardian model.16
Since Southern farmers can only match with traders from their own island, we can use the same
argument as in section 3 to show that the traders￿margins, ￿W, and the level of intermediation,
￿W, will immediately jump to their new steady state values given by:
￿W = ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿W ￿ 1
￿
￿
v (pW)
, (26)
v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿
￿
=
r + ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F
￿
￿W￿
￿￿T
￿
￿W￿ . (27)
Equations (26) and (27) are just the counterparts of (17) and (20) with v
￿
pW￿
> v (p). Using
the two previous expressions, all other equilibrium variables can then be computed by simple
substitutions. In particular, all value functions must directly jump to their new steady state values
15Given our assumptions on the relative size of the two islands, it is easy to check that W-integration necessarily
leaves all equilibrium variables unchanged in the Northern island.
16Recall that by equations (6) and (7),
￿ ￿ C; ￿ S
￿
maximizes v (C;S) subject to pC + S ￿ (p=aC). Thus an increase
in p from aC=aS to a
￿
C=a
￿
S necessarily expands the ￿budget set￿of a farmer-trader match specialized in co⁄ee.
14after W-integration.17
4.3 Intermediation, Growth, and Distributional Consequences
According to equations (20) and (27), the jump in utility levels caused by W-integration will be
associated with a jump in the level of intermediation ￿ triggered by the instantaneous entry of new
traders. Quite intuitively, by free entry, an increase in the gains from trade must be accompanied
by an expansion of the trading activity in the Southern island. As we now demonstrate, this new
e⁄ect has important implications for both growth and the distribution of the gains from trade in
that island.
First, the instantaneous increase in ￿ will slowly increase the number of matched farmers in
the economy, as illustrated by equation (11). Starting from the autarky equilibrium, W-integration
therefore leads to GDP growth along the transition path towards the new steady state equilibrium.18
The magnitude of this ￿growth e⁄ect￿depends on the initial level of intermediation as well as the
properties of the matching technology. If the matching elasticity " ￿
dlnm(uF;uT)
dlnuT is nonincreasing
in the level of intermediation, then ceteris paribus, islands with lower levels of intermediation always
grow faster after W-integration (see Appendix).19 In this situation, trade integration tends to lead
to convergence across countries.
Second, the endogenous increase in the level of intermediation due to W-integration has distri-
butional consequences. Combining equations (26) and (27), we get
￿W = ￿ ￿
"
r + ￿ + ￿T
￿
￿W￿
r + ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F
￿
￿W￿
+ ￿￿T
￿
￿W￿
#
, (28)
where the bracket term is decreasing in ￿W. Thus the instantaneous entry of new traders re-
duces ￿W, and this implies an instantaneous improvement of the farmers￿terms of trade and an
instantaneous worsening of the traders￿terms of trade.
4.4 Welfare Consequences
Changes in the level of intermediation caused by W-integration also have interesting welfare con-
sequences. As we have already mentioned, all value functions will immediately jump to their new
steady-state value after W-integration. Hence the expressions for the expected lifetime utilities of
17It is worth pointing out that the simple dynamics after W-integration hinge heavily on the fact that the Northern
island is large compared to the Southern island. If North was su¢ ciently small to start specializing in sugar, the
relative price of co⁄ee and the levels of intermediation would now depend on one another: a high price of co⁄ee would
lead to more entry in the Southern island, which would increase the world relative supply of co⁄ee, and in turn,
decrease its price. Hence, p
W, ￿, and ￿
￿ would slowly (and interdependently) vary over time. As we later discuss,
our main results about the welfare consequences of W-integration would, however, remain unchanged.
18Although trade integration causes growth in our model, the import penetration ratio remains constant along the
transition path as the number of matched traders a⁄ect proportionally Southern GDP and Southern imports.
19This condition is fairly weak. It is satis￿ed, for instance, for all CES matching functions: m(uF;uT) ￿
h
(AFuF)
￿￿1
￿ + (ATuT)
￿￿1
￿
i ￿
￿￿1, with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, where the restriction, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, is necessary for the Inada
conditions to hold.
15the di⁄erent agents are still given by equations (10), (18), (21), and (22), but with the level of
intermediation now given by ￿W > ￿. Because all these expressions are (weakly) increasing in the
level of intermediation, we can conclude that all agents in the economy are (weakly) better o⁄, and
thus W-integration generates Pareto gains from trade just as in a standard Ricardian model.
It is intuitively clear why the increased matching rate and lower traders￿margins associated with
W-integration will bene￿t farmers. Furthermore, by free entry, it is obvious that unmatched traders
are una⁄ected by W-integration. The free entry condition is also important for understanding why
matched traders will bene￿t from W-integration despite the decrease in their margins. The key is
that because W-integration increases intermediation and reduces the probability with which traders
￿nd matches, free entry dictates that the welfare level they must attain when being matched has
to be higher. Hence, matched traders also bene￿t from W-integration.
What happens to social welfare? The fact that all agents are (weakly) better o⁄ implies, a
fortiori, that social welfare goes up with W-integration. We can, however, make sharper predictions.
For the sake of clarity, let us reintroduce time indices explicitly. At any date t before W-integration,
there are NF ￿ uF (t) matched pairs attaining a joint expected lifetime utility V M
F (t) + V M
T (t), a
measure uF (t) of farmers obtaining V U
F (t), and a measure uT (t) of unmatched traders with zero
expected lifetime utility. Social welfare W (t) is therefore equal to
W (t) = uF (t)V U
F (t) + [NF ￿ uF (t)]
￿
V M
F (t) + V M
T (t)
￿
,
where uF (t) is predetermined at date t, but V U
F (t), V M
F (t), and V M
T (t) are jump variables. By
the Bellman equations (2) and (4) and the free entry condition (10), we also know that
V M
F (t) + V M
T (t) =
v [p(t)] ￿ ￿ + ￿V U
F (t)
r + ￿
.
Thus we can rearrange the social welfare function as
W (t) = V U
F (t)
￿
uF (t) +
￿[NF ￿ uF (t)]
r + ￿
￿
+ [v [p(t)] ￿ ￿]
￿
NF ￿ uF (t)
r + ￿
￿
. (29)
Since uF (t) is predetermined at date t, equation (29) implies that in order to compute the changes
in W (t) associated with W-integration, we can focus on changes in the two jump variables, V U
F (t)
and v [p(t)]￿￿. Using equations (20) and (21) into equation (29), we can express social welfare in
the South before W-integration as:
W (t) = ￿(t) ￿
v [p(t)]
r
,
where
￿(t) ￿
r[NF ￿ uF (t)] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F [￿(t)]NF
r + ￿ + ￿￿T [￿(t)] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F [￿(t)]
.
As explained above, W-integration raises the surplus from trading, as captured by the utility term
16v [p(t)]. This is the standard welfare gain highlighted by neoclassical models of trade. Notice,
however, that ￿(t) is increasing in the level of intermediation ￿(t) and hence it also increases
following W-integration. We can then conclude that, compared to a standard Ricardian model, in
which ￿ = 0 and so ￿(t) = +1, the integration of Walrasian markets leads to a higher (percentage)
increase in social welfare. We refer to this result as the ￿magni￿cation e⁄ect￿of intermediation.
This is, of course, the welfare counterpart of the growth e⁄ect discussed in the previous section.20
Proposition 2 summarizes our ￿ndings about the e⁄ects of W-integration.
Proposition 2 W-integration: (i) induces growth along the transition path and, if the matching
elasticity " is nonincreasing in the level of intermediation, leads to convergence across islands; (ii)
improves the farmers￿terms of trade and worsens the traders￿terms of trade; and (iii) makes all
agents (weakly) better o⁄.
In the case where the Southern island is not small relative to the Northern island, one can still
show, in spite of the more complex terms-of-trade dynamics, that: (i) the values of ￿W and
￿
￿W￿￿
at any point in time are greater than their autarky levels, ￿ and ￿￿; and: (ii) the value functions
of all agents at any point in time are also greater than their autarky levels. We can thus conclude
that W-integration increases output and makes all agents (weakly) better o⁄ at all points in time
(see Appendix for details).
5 Integration of Matching Markets
5.1 Assumptions
So far we have assumed that traders can only meet farmers from their own island. We now turn
to a situation in which traders are (unexpectedly) allowed to search for farmers in both islands
(though they can only search for farmers in one of these two islands at any point in time). We
refer to this process as matching market integration, or simply M-integration, and we show below
that the welfare implications of this type of integration are much more nuanced. In order to better
illustrate our results, we assume that W-integration has already happened and that Northern and
Southern traders have access to a common (integrated) Walrasian market where co⁄ee is exchanged
at a relative price pW = a￿
C=a￿
S.21
As before, we continue to assume that islands di⁄er in their intermediation costs and in the
primitive bargaining power of traders. In order to avoid a taxonomic exercise, we assume throughout
that Northern traders have a better intermediation technology, that is ￿ > ￿￿, and that Northern
20Note that, in line with Diamond (1980), we are computing the e⁄ect of W-integration taking into account the
convergent path from one steady state to another, rather than simply comparing steady-state welfare levels with
and without W-integration. While this distinction is immaterial for the qualitative results derived in this section, it
turns out to be important when analyzing the consequences of M-integration. Note also that while our magni￿cation
e⁄ect implictly refers to changes in the social welfare function, a similar e⁄ect would arise if we were to consider
compensating variations instead; details are available upon request.
21The fact that the relative price p
W is common across countries is not important for the results below.
17agents, regardless of whether they are farmers or traders, tend to have high primitive bargaining
power relative to Southern agents. In particular, when Northern traders bargain with Southern
farmers, they obtain a share ￿ ￿ of the ex-post gains from trade that is higher than that obtained by
Southern traders bargaining with these same Southern farmers, that is ￿ ￿ > ￿.22
Throughout this section, we do not take a stance on the precise source of asymmetry of bar-
gaining power. In the next section, we will demonstrate that the di⁄erence between the size of
Northern and Southern ￿trading companies￿can provide a simple and natural micro-foundation
for the di⁄erence in their primitive bargaining power. In this extension larger trading companies
will be associated with higher primitive bargaining power. For this reason, we ￿nd it natural to
focus on the case in which, if cross-country bargaining power asymmetries exist, they are associated
with Northern agents being relatively more powerful negotiators.23
Before proceeding to our analysis of the consequences of M-integration, we also need to specify
how matching between agents from di⁄erent islands takes place. Consistently with our closed-
economy setup, we assume that if Northern and Southern traders both operate in the same island,
then they have the same probability of being matched with farmers from that island. In other
words, matching remains random. Farmers cannot direct their search towards one particular type
of traders. This assumption aims to capture a situation in which farmers have no information about
where traders are located in the island. Thus they simply stay in their farms and wait for traders
to show up (or not).
Finally, note that the heterogeneity between traders from the two islands forces us to consider
the endogenous destruction of matches. For instance, if Northern traders are much more e¢ cient
than Southern traders, it is possible for the joint surplus of a matched pair consisting of a Southern
trader and a Southern farmer to be lower than the new (post M-integration) outside opportunity of
the matched farmer (which is his or her value when being unmatched). In those circumstances, ￿all-
Southern￿partnerships should e¢ ciently dissolve. In order to introduce this possibility formally,
we assume that after matches are created, but before bargaining takes place, farmers can break
their matches with traders from island i.
5.2 Equilibrium Conditions
We ￿rst study how M-integration a⁄ects the mix of traders operating in each island. Relative to
the Northern traders searching in a given island, Southern traders searching in the same island
incur a higher intermediation cost per period and, when ￿nding a match, they have relatively lower
22Similarly, Southern traders that bargain with Northern farmers obtain a share ￿ of the ex-post gains from trade
that is lower than that obtained by Northern traders bargaining with these same Northern farmers, that is ￿ < ￿
￿.
We shall brie￿ y show, however, that Southern traders will never intermediate trade in the North in equilibrium.
23The large literature emanating from the seminal work of Rubinstein (1982), has uncovered other potential deter-
minants of primitive bargaining power. It is well-known, for instance, that relatively impatient or risk averse agents
will tend to have relatively low bargaining power, and the same will be true about agents for which a bargaining
delay might be particularly costly for reasons other than impatience, such as credit constraints. See, for instance,
Rubinstein (1982), Roth (1985), and Roth and Rothblum (1982). These alternative explanations also suggest that
Northern agents are likely to be relatively more powerful negotiators.
18bargaining power. Since the surplus being generated by a match with a Northern trader is higher,
v
￿
pW￿
￿￿￿ > v
￿
pW￿
￿￿, farmers are also more likely to stay in a match that involves a Northern
trader than to keep searching for another type of trader. Putting all the previous pieces together,
we have that Northern traders will necessarily be more pro￿table (i.e., attain higher welfare levels)
than Southern traders under random matching; see Appendix for details. Appealing to free entry,
we can then conclude:
Lemma 1 If M-integration occurs at some unexpected date t0, then with probability one, new
matches only involve Northern traders in both islands for all t > t0.
It is important to emphasize that the previous result does not necessarily imply that M-
integration instantly wipes out all Southern traders from the world economy. When M-integration
occurs, we know that there is a positive measure of matched pairs composed of a Southern trader
and a Souther farmer. As argued above, as long as the joint value of this pair exceeds the new
value of an unmatched farmer, these pairs will not dissolve. Whether this condition holds depends
on the features of the new equilibrium, which we now describe.
Since the relative price of co⁄ee must remain ￿xed at the Northern autarky level, the joint
consumption that a trader and a farmer can attain by forming a match in either of the two islands
(i.e., v(pW) and v￿(pW)) will not be a⁄ected by M-integration and will feature no dynamics. Fur-
thermore, Lemma 1 immediately implies that M-integration will have no e⁄ect on the North, so we
can again focus on the South.
Under M-integration, there are six types of agents potentially active in the Southern island at
any point in time: (i) unmatched Southern farmers, (ii) Southern farmers matched with Northern
traders, (iii) unmatched Northern traders, (iv) matched Northern traders, (v) Southern farmers
matched with Southern traders, and (vi) matched Southern traders. We denote by V U
F , V M
FN, V U
TN,
V M
TN, V M
FS, and V M
TS the expected lifetime utilities of these six types of agents. Using Lemma 1 and
the fact that all Southern farmers specialize in co⁄ee production, we can then express the Bellman
equations of these agents as follows:
rV U
F = ￿F
￿
￿N￿￿
V M
FN ￿ V U
F
￿
+ _ V U
F , (30)
rV M
FN =
￿
1 ￿ ￿N￿
v(pW) + ￿
￿
V U
F ￿ V M
FN
￿
+ _ V M
FN, (31)
rV U
TN = ￿￿￿ + ￿T
￿
￿N￿￿
V M
TN ￿ V U
TN
￿
+ _ V U
TN, (32)
rV M
TN = ￿Nv(pW) ￿ ￿￿ + ￿
￿
V U
TN ￿ V M
TN
￿
+ _ V M
TN, (33)
rV M
FS =
￿
1 ￿ ￿S￿
v(pW) + ￿
￿
V U
F ￿ V M
FS
￿
+ _ V M
FS, (34)
rV M
TS = ￿Sv(pW) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿V M
TS + _ V M
TS, (35)
where ￿N denotes the level of intermediation in the Southern island after M-integration, and ￿N
and ￿S denote the margins of Northern and Southern traders, respectively. In addition, at all
19points in time, free entry by Northern traders will necessarily imply that
V U
TN = _ V U
TN = 0.
Combining the previous expression with equations (30)-(33) and our Nash bargaining conditions,
it is easy to verify that the Northern traders￿margins, ￿N, and the level of intermediation after
M-integration, ￿N, will immediately satisfy
￿N = ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿N ￿ 1
￿
￿￿
v (pW)
(36)
v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿
￿￿ =
r + ￿ +
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿F
￿
￿N￿
￿ ￿￿T
￿
￿N￿ . (37)
These two expressions are just the counterpart of Equations (26) and (27) with ￿￿ < ￿ and ￿ > ￿.
Compared to W-integration, the value of a matched farmer-trader pair, v
￿
pW￿
, remains the same,
but the level of intermediation in the South is now determined by the characteristics of Northern
traders: ￿￿ and ￿. Because only Northern traders search for matches after M-integration, only their
(Northern) parameters are relevant for the determination of ￿N. It may seem counterintuitive that
the level of intermediation in South immediately jumps to its new steady-state level and that this
level is completely independent of the intermediation cost or bargaining power of Southern traders.
After all, some Southern traders may remain active after M-integration and their measure gradually
declines through time. The logic is the same as in sections 3 and 4: the measure of unmatched
Northern traders is a jump variable and it can always ensure that the level of intermediation is
such that the expected lifetime utility of unmatched Northern traders in South is exactly equal to
zero (independently of the measure of Southern farmers searching for matches).
Combining equations (34) and (35) with our Nash bargaining conditions, we can also show (see
proof of Lemma 1 for details) that the margins of Southern traders must also immediately jump to
￿S = ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿￿N ￿ 1
￿
￿
v (pW)
, (38)
where ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
< 1. Equipped with equations (36)-(38), all other equi-
librium variables can then be computed by simple substitutions. In particular, it is easy to show
that all value functions must directly jump to their new steady state values.24 Using equations
(30), (31), (34), and (35), we can thus write the expected lifetime utilities of Southern agents after
24Like in section 4, the absence of dynamics in intermediation levels and traders￿margins hinges on the fact that
North is large compared to South, which pins down the relative price of co⁄ee in the Walrasian markets.
20M-integration as follows:
V U
F =
￿F
￿
￿N￿￿
1 ￿ ￿N￿
v
￿
pW￿
r
￿
r + ￿ + ￿F
￿
￿N￿￿ , (39)
V M
FN =
￿
1 ￿ ￿N￿
v
￿
pW￿
+ ￿V U
F
r + ￿
, (40)
V M
FS =
￿
1 ￿ ￿S￿
v
￿
pW￿
+ ￿V U
F
r + ￿
, (41)
V M
TS =
￿Sv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿
r + ￿
. (42)
Finally, note that equations (41) and (42) imply that v
￿
pW￿
￿￿ ￿ rV U
F is a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for existing Southern matches to survive after M-integration. Using equations (36), (37)
and (39), we can simplify this condition to v
￿
pW￿
￿￿ ￿
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿￿N, where ￿N is implicitly
determined by equation (37). For a given value of ￿N, the previous inequality states that existing
Southern matches are more likely to survive if the surplus generated by a match is high, i.e., if
v
￿
pW￿
is high or ￿ is low.
5.3 Intermediation, Growth, and Distributional Consequences
Since ￿ > ￿￿ and ￿ < ￿, equations (27) and (37) imply that M-integration necessarily increases
the level of intermediation in South: ￿N > ￿W. Intuitively, though the entry of Northern traders
wipes out all unmatched Southern traders, these Northern traders bring a better intermediation
technology and have a higher bargaining power, so it is not surprising that their entry exceeds that
of Southern traders prior to M-integration.25 Like in section 4, this instantaneous increase in the
level of intermediation will increase the number of matched farmers in the South, thereby generating
growth along the transition path. Furthermore, for the same reasons as in section 4, if the matching
elasticity " ￿
dlnm(uF;uT)
dlnuT is nonincreasing in the level of intermediation, the lower is the level of
intermediation in the South, the faster will output grow in that island after M-integration.
We can next study how M-integration a⁄ects the share of the surplus that farmers are able to
capture when matched with a trader. Here we have to distinguish between the cases in which the
farmer is matched with a Northern trader and in which he or she continues to be matched with
the same Southern trader as before M-integration. Let us consider the former case ￿rst. Equation
(36) suggests that the e⁄ect of M-integration on the share of surplus captured by (newly) matched
Southern farmers is in general ambiguous. On the one hand, the higher level of intermediation
￿N under M-integration tends to improve the Southern farmers￿terms of trade compared to W-
integration, i.e., ￿N tends to be lower than ￿W on that account. On the other hand, the fact that
￿ ￿ > ￿ mechanically decreases the share of consumption accruing to Southern farmers matched with
25If both Northern and Southern farmers were completely specialized in the production of sugar and co⁄ee, respec-
tively, the same prediction would hold at any point in time (in spite of the dynamics in the relative price of co⁄ee).
In addition, changes in the level of intermediation in the South would lead to an improvement in the Northern terms
of trade, i.e. a decrease in the relative price of co⁄ee, which would also raise the level of intermediation in the North.
21Northern traders. When Northern and Southern traders di⁄er only in their cost of intermediation,
￿ and ￿￿, the ￿rst e⁄ect implies that, as in the case of W-integration, M-integration improves the
terms of trade of newly matched Southern farmers. Nevertheless, the converse is true for the case
in which ￿ ! ￿￿ and ￿ ￿ > ￿ (see Appendix for details).
What happens to the terms of trade of Southern agents that were already matched before M-
integration occurs? Comparing equations (26) and (38), we immediately see that the impact of
M-integration on the Southern traders￿margins is also ambiguous. The entry of Northern traders
in the Southern island has two e⁄ects. By increasing the level of intermediation from ￿W to ￿N,
M-integration improves the outside option of matched farmers in the Southern island, which tends
to improve their terms of trade and worsen the Southern traders￿terms of trade. But conditional
on the level of intermediation, Northern traders tend to have more bargaining power than Southern
traders, ￿ is strictly less than one in equation (38), which tends to worsen Southern farmers￿outside
option and improve the Southern traders￿terms of trade. As we demonstrate in the next section,
whether ￿S is higher or lower than ￿W will be closely related to changes in social welfare and the
so-called Hosios (1990a) condition in the search-theoretical literature.26
5.4 Welfare Consequences
Our previous discussion hints at the fact that the welfare implications of M-integration are likely
to be distinct from those of W-integration. Our ￿rst result in that respect is that, unlike in the
case of W-integration, M-integration always creates winners and losers, and thus distributional
con￿ icts. In particular, the e⁄ect on Southern traders￿welfare is always of the opposite sign to that
on Southern farmers, no matter whether the latter are matched or not at the time of M-integration.
To see this, note that equations (41) and (42), together with Nash bargaining, imply
V M
TS = ￿
"
v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿ ￿ rV U
F
r + ￿
#
. (43)
Among existing matches, the intermediation technology, ￿, the primitive bargaining power of the
trader, ￿, and the utility level, v
￿
pW￿
are una⁄ected by M-integration. Therefore, we can conclude
that if unmatched Southern farmers win from M-integration, ￿V U
F > 0, matched Southern traders
must lose, ￿V M
TS < 0. The converse is obviously true as well: if unmatched Southern farmers lose,
Southern traders must win. By equation (42), this result implies that there is a negative relationship
26It is worth pointing out that, in general, one cannot rank the relative magnitude of the bargaining shares of
Northern and Southern traders, ￿
N and ￿
S. Given that the primitive bargaining power of Northern traders is higher
than that of Southern traders, it would seem intuitive that ￿
N > ￿
S. Yet, the ranking of intermediation costs,
￿
￿ < ￿, implies that the ex-post gains from trade are lower in the ￿all-Southern￿ pairs. Thus conditional on the
same outside option, V
U
F , Southern farmers tend to obtain a lower payo⁄ when matched with Southern traders, which
tends to make ￿
S greater than ￿
N. Which of the two e⁄ects dominates again depends on the relative magnitude of
the variation in primitive bargaining power, ￿ and ￿ ￿, and intermediation costs, ￿ and ￿
￿. According to equations
(36) and (38), if traders from both islands only di⁄er in their primitive bargaining power, ￿ ! ￿
￿, then we should
observe that ￿
N > ￿
S. By contrast, if their di⁄erences only come from their intermediation technology, ￿ ! ￿ ￿, then
we should have ￿
N < ￿
S.
22between movements in V U
F and movements in ￿S. Armed with this observation, inspection of
equation (41) then reveals that the welfare e⁄ect on matched farmers is always of the same sign as
that of unmatched farmers. For instance, when V U
F goes up, ￿S goes down, and V M
FS in (41) must
necessarily go up. The intuition is simple. Among existing matches, M-integration only a⁄ects the
outside option of Southern farmers, with the latter being equal to the value of unmatched Southern
farmers. When this outside option goes up (i.e., ￿S goes down), existing pairs redistribute surplus
from traders to farmers, while the converse is true when this outside option goes down. The
likelihood of each of these two scenarios will be studied in more detail below.27
Up to this point, we have shown that there cannot be any Pareto gains or losses from M-
integration.28 This leaves open, however, the possibility of aggregate losses from trade in the
Southern island. In order to investigate this question formally, let us come back to the social welfare
function introduced in section 4.4. At any date t before M-integration and after W-integration, we
know that
W (t) = V U
F (t)
￿
uF (t) +
￿[NF ￿ uF (t)]
r + ￿
￿
+
￿
v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿
￿￿
NF ￿ uF (t)
r + ￿
￿
.
Since v
￿
pW￿
is not a⁄ected by M-integration and uF (t) is predetermined at date t, the previous
expression implies that changes in social welfare caused by M-integration, ￿W, must re￿ ect changes
in the expected lifetime utility of unmatched farmers, ￿V U
F . Given our earlier discussion of the
relationship between V U
F , V M
TS, and ￿S, this further implies the Southern traders￿terms of trade,
￿S, is a su¢ cient statistic for welfare analysis in the South.29 In particular, there will be aggregate
losses from M-integration in the South, ￿W < 0, if and only if ￿S > ￿W.30
Using equations (36), (37), and (39) as well as their counterparts under W-integration, we can
compute explicitly the change in the expected lifetime utility of unmatched farmers caused by
M-integration as
￿V U
F =
￿N￿￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿)
r￿ ￿
￿
￿W￿(1 ￿ ￿)
r￿
. (44)
As our analysis of the distributional consequences of M-integration already anticipates, it will prove
useful to separate the rest of our welfare analysis into two parts. First, we consider the case in
which di⁄erences in intermediation costs are the only di⁄erence in market institutions across the
two islands: ￿ < ￿￿, but ￿ ! ￿ ￿. Second, we turn to the polar case in which intermediation costs
are similar across countries, ￿ ! ￿￿, but bargaining powers are not, ￿ < ￿ ￿.
27In the previous discussion, we implicitly assumed that existing Southern matches were not destroyed after M-
integration. If this were to happen, then we would have V
M
FS +V
M
TS ￿V
U
F =
￿
v
￿
p
W￿
￿ ￿ ￿ rV
U
F
￿￿
(r + ￿) < 0, which
requires V
U
F goes up. In this case, unmatched and matched Southern farmers are again better o⁄, whereas Southern
traders are worse o⁄.
28Comparing convergent paths rather than steady states is important for deriving this result. If Southern traders
win from M-integration, then in the new steady state, the only winners from M-integration have disappeared, and
we would erroneously conclude that M-integration generates Pareto losses.
29Formally, equations (42) and (43) imply V
U
F =
￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿
S￿
v
￿
p
W￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿￿
r￿.
30This observation would play an important role in the design of optimal policy. It suggests that governments
aiming to maximize social welfare can use the (observable) response of ￿
S as a useful guide to policy, with welfare
attaining its maximum when ￿
S attains its minimum.
23If Northern and Southern traders only di⁄er in terms of their intermediation costs, equation
(44) and ￿N > ￿W immediately imply that ￿V U
F > 0 and M-integration necessarily increases
social welfare in the Southern island. Intuitively, in this case M-integration essentially provides
unmatched Southern farmers with access to a better intermediation technology, which increases the
rate at which they meet traders and, in addition, improves their bargaining positions. By a⁄ecting
the threat point in their negotiations, M-integration also makes matched Southern farmers better
o⁄ and matched Southern traders worse o⁄.
In the polar case in which Northern and Southern traders only di⁄er in terms of their bargaining
power, M-integration is equivalent to an increase in the bargaining power of unmatched traders from
￿ to ￿ ￿. As equation (44) indicates, its e⁄ect on aggregate welfare in the Southern island depends on
two forces. On the one hand, a larger ￿ implies more entry and thus a higher probability of being
matched for Southern farmers. On the other hand, once matched, Southern farmers have weaker
bargaining power. In the Appendix, we show that social welfare is increasing in ￿ if and only if
￿ ￿ " ￿
dlnm(uF;uT)
dlnuT , which in the search-theoretic literature on labor markets is referred to as
Hosios￿(1990a) condition. Hence, if ￿ ￿ ", the second force will dominate and by raising primitive
traders￿primitive bargaining power from ￿ to ￿ ￿, M-integration will reduce aggregate welfare in
the South. Note that aggregate losses in the Southern island are possible in spite of the fact that
M-integration always induces output growth compared to W-integration.
What explains these results? The source of these potentially perverse welfare results is not rent-
shifting between the two islands.31 If social welfare goes down in the South after M-integration,
then social welfare goes down in the world as a whole. Instead, what is important here is that when
￿ ￿ ", the equilibrium in the Southern island under W-integration is ine¢ cient because it features
a disproportionate entry of traders given the matching frictions. The key behind the ine¢ ciency
is the trading externality underlying the search friction in goods markets. More speci￿cally, the
terms of exchange between a trader and a farmer not only a⁄ect the division of surplus among these
two agents, but also a⁄ect the entry of traders and thus the probabilities for unmatched farmers
and traders of ￿nding a match. Nevertheless, farmers and traders only bargain after they have
found a match and thus their negotiations will fail to internalize this externality. M-integration
only aggravates this problem because Northern traders have an even higher bargaining power, and
thus social welfare is driven down. This result clearly echoes Bhagwati￿ s (1971) celebrated results
on trade and domestic distortions.
An obvious question at this point is: if unmatched Southern farmers are worse o⁄ under M-
integration, why do they trade with Northern traders? The answer is that random matching￿
which we believe ￿ttingly captures search frictions in an environment where traders are mobile, but
farmers are not￿ leads to a simple prisoner￿ s dilemma situation. Although all Southern farmers
are worse o⁄ in the equilibrium in which only Northern traders are active, each Southern farmer
individually has an incentive to trade with Northern traders. This is true both ex ante and ex post,
31A welfare analysis based on the comparison of steady states would wrongly suggest otherwise. In the new steady
state, it is true that matched Northern traders earn rents that used to accrue to Southern traders. But since there
are no matched Northern traders at t0, such considerations are irrelevant for computing welfare changes at that date.
24i.e., both before and after matches occur. Even if Southern farmers had the choice to commit not
to trade with Northern traders ex ante, each farmer would strictly prefer to trade with Northern
traders, independently of what other traders are doing. The intuition is the following. Because of
Nash bargaining, Northern traders always give Southern farmers more than what they would get
if unmatched. Since farmers are all of measure zero, they do not internalize the impact of their
own actions on the composition of traders in the island. As a result, farmers are always better o⁄
trading with Northern traders, thereby leading to the exit of all unmatched Southern traders. If
the primitive bargaining power of Northern traders is high enough, this may lead to lower aggregate
welfare in the Southern island (and the world as whole).
Our main results about the impact of M-integration are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 M-integration: (i) always induces growth along the transition path and, if the
matching elasticity " is nonincreasing in the level of intermediation, leads to convergence across
islands; (ii) always creates winners and losers; and (iii) may decrease aggregate welfare.
6 Extensions
Our model of intermediation in trade is special along several dimensions. A natural concern is
the robustness of our main results to various modi￿cations of some of our key assumptions. We
tackle this issue in this section. To save on space, we focus on sketching alternative environments
and summarizing their main implications. A detailed analysis of our three main extensions can be
found in our online Addendum.
6.1 Large Northern Traders
So far, our analysis has abstracted from any issues related to the size of traders because we have
treated both Southern and Northern traders as in￿nitesimally small. In practice, Northern inter-
mediaries operating in developing countries often di⁄er from their local counterparts by the scale
of their operations. This is the case, for example, in the Ugandan co⁄ee industry in which interme-
diation is dominated by a few large European buyers. In this ￿nal extension, we introduce ￿large￿
Northern traders and investigate their implications for the consequences of M-integration.32
We formalize the notion of ￿large￿Northern traders by assuming that there is an exogenously
given number n of Northern trading companies operating in the South each consisting of an en-
dogenous measure, x > 0, of traders.33 Under M-integration, the matching between each individual
member of the trading company and Southern farmers is as described in Section 5. Bargaining,
however, now proceeds under the common knowledge that if a farmer refuses to trade with a given
member of a trading company, other members of that trading company will stop intermediating
on her behalf until she has been matched with a Southern trader or another Northern trading
32The characteristics of Northern traders have, of course, no implications for the consequences of W-integration.
33For simplicity, we focus on symmetric equilibria in which x is constant across all Northern trading companies.
25company.34 Hence, the Nash bargaining consumption levels of a Southern farmer-Northern trader
match with good i, (CFi;SFi;CTi;STi), now solves
max
CFi;SFi;CTi;STi
￿
V M
TN
i
￿ V U
TN
￿￿ ￿
V M
FN
i
￿ V U
F
￿1￿￿
s.t. pCFi + SFi + pCTi + STi ￿ (p=aC) ￿ IC + (1=aS)(1 ￿ IC);
where V U
F is the expected lifetime utility of an unmatched Southern farmer if she were to refuse
to trade. Compared to Section 5, the key di⁄erence lies in the fact that V U
F is now di⁄erent from
the expected lifetime utility, V U
F , of an unmatched farmer who has never refused to trade (or has
since been matched with another trader). Formally, these two value functions satisfy the following
Bellman equations:
rV U
F = ￿F
￿
￿N￿￿
￿
￿
V M
FN ￿ V U
F
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
V M
FS ￿ V U
F
￿￿
+ _ V U
F ,
rV U
F = ￿F
￿
￿N￿
￿￿
n ￿ 1
n
￿
￿
￿
V M
FN ￿ V U
F
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
V M
FS ￿ V U
F
￿
￿
+ _ V
U
F
where ￿ ￿ uTN/[uTN + uTS] is the share of unmatched Northern traders, and V M
FN ￿ max
n
V M
FN
C
;V M
FN
S
o
and V M
FS ￿ max
n
V M
FS
C
;V M
FS
S
o
still denote the expected lifetime utilities of Southern farmers matched
with Northern and Southern traders, respectively. The rest of our model is as described in Section
5, with x being endogenously determined through free entry.
In this environment, one can show that:
Proposition 4 The equilibrium under M-integration with large Northern traders is isomorphic
to an equilibrium under M-integration with in￿nitesimally small Northern traders with primitive
bargaining power
￿L ￿ ￿
r + ￿F
￿
￿N￿
r + ￿F
￿
￿N￿￿
￿ +
￿n￿1
n
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿￿ > ￿.
Proposition 4 indicates that the di⁄erence between the size of Northern and Southern trading
companies provides a simple and natural micro-foundation for the di⁄erence in primitive bargaining
power between Northern and Southern traders assumed in Section 5. Quite naturally, when n !
+1, we have x ! 0 and ￿L ! ￿, so we revert back to our original model. Another interesting
implication of Proposition 4 is that even in the absence of di⁄erences in primitive bargaining power
between Northern and Southern traders, ￿ = ￿, M-integration may lead to aggregate welfare losses
if Northern traders are large. In this situation, however, welfare losses are not associated with an
ine¢ ciently high entry of Northern traders, but rather with the fact that these trading companies
are ine¢ ciently large.
34We are thus assuming that matching has a ￿cleansing￿e⁄ect on a farmer￿ s past behavior. Thus once a punished
farmer has been matched with another trader, either from the North or the South, he can no longer be recognized by
the Northern trading company that had previously ostracized him. While this assumption is admittedly ad-hoc, it
considerably simpli￿es the analysis below. Since newly matched farmers can no longer be punished, traders￿margins
are independent of farmers￿history.
266.2 Endogenous Number of Farmers, Exogenous Number of Traders
In previous sections we have focused on economies with an exogenous number of farmers and an
endogenous number of traders. We now discuss the polar case, often emphasized in the early
development economics literature (see for instance Bates, 1984 and Bauer, 2000), in which the
number of traders is exogenously given by government regulations, whereas the number of farmers
is endogenously determined by their choices between ￿market￿and ￿non-market￿activities.
Preferences, technology, matching, and bargaining are as described in Section 2. Compared
to Section 2, we assume that an exogenous measure NT of the island inhabitants are traders,
and for simplicity, that these traders can be connected to Walrasian markets at zero cost, ￿ = 0.
Conversely, we assume that there is a large pool of potential farmers who can decide at any point in
time to become active or inactive. As in Section 2, active farmers get zero utility per period when
unmatched, but stand to obtain some remuneration when matched with a trader. By contrast,
inactive farmers are now involved in a non-market activity that generates a constant expected
lifetime utility, V ￿
F > 0, e.g., subsistence agriculture. We assume that the pool of potential traders
is large enough to ensure that the measure of farmers operating on the island, NF, is not constrained
by population size and that some agents are always involved in subsistence agriculture. Hence, in
equilibrium, NF is endogenously pinned down by the farmers￿indi⁄erence condition.
In this new environment, the equilibrium conditions (1)-(9) and (11)-(12) are unchanged (but
for the fact that ￿ = 0). The only di⁄erence between our original model and the present one
comes from the counterpart of equation (10), which now applies to the expected lifetime utility of
unmatched farmer rather than the expected lifetime utility of unmatched traders:
V U
F = V ￿
F.
Using the previous equilibrium conditions and the same strategy as in Sections 4 and 5, one can
establish the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that there is an endogenous number of farmers and an exogenous number
of traders. Then, W-integration worsens the farmers￿terms of trade, improves the traders￿terms of
trade, and makes all agents (weakly) better o⁄. By contrast, M-integration always creates winners
and losers and may decrease aggregate welfare.
According to Proposition 5, the welfare impact of W- and M-integration in environments with
an endogenous number of farmers and an exogenous number of traders is qualitatively similar to its
impact in our original model. The main di⁄erence between the predictions of the two models comes
from the distributional implications of W-integration. In this new model, W-integration triggers
the entry of new farmers into ￿market activities￿ , which reduces the level of intermediation, and
in turn, increases the traders￿margins.
A more subtle di⁄erence between the two models concerns the welfare impact of M-integration.
While aggregate welfare losses under M-integration are possible in both models, these losses in
27our original model re￿ ects the trade-o⁄ between higher levels of intermediation, which raise the
expected lifetime utility of unmatched farmers and hence aggregate welfare, and lower farmers￿
margins, which decrease them. By contrast, in the present version of the model, the losses are
associated with the dissipation of traders￿rents by the entry of a set of traders, the Northern ones,
with higher bargaining power.35 As a result of this distinct intuitions, the condition ￿ ￿ > ￿ is
su¢ cient to generate welfare losses in the South, regardless of the value of the matching function
elasticity " (see online Addendum for details).
6.3 Occupational Choices
Both our original model and the previous two extensions rule out the possibility of agents endoge-
nously choosing to become traders or farmers. This assumption describes fairly well, for instance,
situations in which trading activities are only undertaken by a particular ethnic group. Such situ-
ations are frequent in the context of developing countries; see e.g. Landa (1981) or Rauch (2001).
From a theoretical standpoint, however, one may be concerned that the lack of occupational choices
in our model is crucial for many of our results. With that in mind, we turn to a variation of our
original model that allows for endogenous occupational decisions.
Compared to Section 2, we now assume that the island is inhabited by a measure L of agents
who, at any point in time, can either become farmers or traders. For simplicity, we also assume that
traders can be connected to Walrasian markets at zero cost, ￿ = 0, as in our previous extension. The
rest of our model is unchanged. In terms of equilibrium conditions, the key di⁄erence between the
model described in Section 2 and the present one is that the expected lifetime utility of unmatched
farmers and traders must now satisfy:
V U
T ￿ V U
F , if NT > 0,
V U
F ￿ V U
T , if NF > 0.
This is the counterpart of the free entry condition, equation (10), in our original model. In any non-
degenerate equilibrium with both types of agents being active, the previous conditions, of course,
imply that agents must be indi⁄erent between becoming a farmer or a trader: V U
T = V U
F .
In such an economy, the impact of W- and M-integration can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 6 Suppose that all agents can become farmers or traders at any point in time. Then,
W-integration does not a⁄ect the farmers￿and traders￿terms of trade and makes all agents (weakly)
better o⁄. By contrast, M-integration may create winners and losers and decrease aggregate welfare.
Not surprisingly, the introduction of endogenous occupational decisions does a⁄ect the distri-
butional consequences of W-integration. In this new model, W-integration no longer a⁄ects the
level intermediation, which is entirely pinned down by the primitive bargaining power ￿ of traders.
Since agents must be indi⁄erent between farming and trading activities both before and after the
35A related treatment of the rent-shifting e⁄ects of M-integration can be found in Antr￿s and Costinot (2010b).
28W-integration, their share of the surplus must remain unchanged.36 Perhaps more interestingly,
Proposition 6 demonstrates that allowing agents to switch freely between occupations does not rule
out the possibility of aggregate welfare losses under M-integration. Like in Section 5, such losses
may still occur if the primitive bargaining power of Southern traders, ￿, the primitive bargaining
power of Northern traders, ￿, and the matching elasticity, ", are such that ￿ > ￿ > ". The basic
idea is the following. If ￿ is close enough to ", M-integration must reduce the expected lifetime
utility of unmatched Southern traders by more than it reduces the expected lifetime utility of un-
matched Southern farmers because the negative e⁄ect of the increase in the level of intermediation
(or negative congestion externality) associated with the entry of Northern traders necessarily out-
weighs the positive e⁄ect of the decrease in the expected lifetime utility of unmatched Southern
farmers. Accordingly, even when Southern agents can freely choose their occupation, there exist
circumstances such that M-integration: (i) leads all agents to become farmers (and thus Lemma
1 continues to apply); and (ii) lowers both the expected lifetime utility of unmatched farmers and
aggregate welfare. An important di⁄erence relative to our benchmark model in section 2 is that the
condition ￿ > ￿ > " is no longer su¢ cient to ensure aggregate losses from M-integration in South.
6.4 Other Extensions
In this ￿nal subsection, we brie￿ y outline three alternative variants of our model. The ￿rst two
extensions attempt to capture the fact that the relocation of resources to the comparative advantage
sector may be slower than in our original Ricardian-style framework. The ￿nal extension illustrates
how introducing heterogeneity in farmer productivity generates positive predictions from our model
that seem in line with available empirical evidence.
In our original model we have assumed that farmers can costlessly switch from producing sugar
in one period (or instant) to producing co⁄ee in the next. This facilitates the comparison between
our original model and a standard Ricardian one, but it raises the issue of whether our results are
sensitive to this assumption. A particularly simple way to address this concern is to consider the
extreme case in which farmers decide at some initial date which good to grow and, after that, are
unable to switch to a di⁄erent crop. While this is obviously as unrealistic as the situation considered
in our benchmark model, it will allow us to illustrate the sensitivity of our results to farmers￿
switching costs in the most straightforward manner. It is easy to check that the steady state of this
alternative economy is identical to that of our original model and that the e⁄ects of M-integration
are also identical (provided again that M-integration does not alter the Walrasian relative price).
Less trivially, one can also verify that W-integration continues to generate aggregate welfare gains
that are magni￿ed relative to an analogous economy with zero intermediation costs. Such an
analogous economy, however, is no longer a Ricardian one, but rather resembles an endowment
economy. Accordingly, W-integration generates richer distributional e⁄ects and may no longer
36It is also worth pointing out that since the intermediation level is not a⁄ected by W-integration, there is no
￿magni￿cation e⁄ect.￿In our original model, W-integration leads more traders to leave their hammocks, which leads
to positive growth and welfare e⁄ects. Here no additional resources are being pulled into co⁄ee and sugar production,
hence the lack of magni￿cation e⁄ect.
29make all the agents in the economy (weakly) better o⁄.
Another way to capture the imperfect reallocation of resources to the comparative advantage
sector is to assume that traders, because of sector-speci￿c skills or knowledge, can intermediate trade
for only one type of farmers in the economy. While the steady state of this alternative economy
is again identical to that in our original model, the transitional dynamics are quite distinct. In
particular, matched Southern farmers growing sugar prior to W-integration, now need to wait for a
match with a ￿ co⁄ee trader￿to start growing and selling co⁄ee, and as a result, they may be worse
o⁄ under W-integration. Despite these di⁄erences, W-integration continues to generate aggregate
welfare gains, while the e⁄ects of M-integration are identical to those described in section 5.
Finally, our original model may also accommodate productivity heterogeneity across farmers.
Consider, for instance, an environment with two types of farmers: an exogenous share ￿ of farmers
has access to the same technologies as in our original model, while the remaining share 1 ￿ ￿ has
access to technologies that are ! times higher. Furthermore, suppose that farmers may now access
Walrasian markets, though only after incurring a cost ￿F > ￿. It can be shown that whenever ! and
￿F are large, there exists an equilibrium in which more productive farmers bypass intermediaries
and directly market their own goods, while less productive farmers continue to wait for traders
at their farms. This simple sorting pattern is consistent with available empirical evidence on the
use of intermediaries (see Ahn et al., 2009, Blum et al., 2009, Akerman, 2010, or Bernard et al.,
2010). In this variant of our model W-integration again generates magni￿ed gains from trade, while
M-integration reduces Southern welfare under the same conditions as in section 5. Interestingly,
this extension of our original framework also predicts that within-farmer lifetime expected income
inequality is reduced by W-integration, but increased by M-integration whenever the latter is welfare
reducing.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a simple model to study the role of intermediaries in world trade. Our model
illustrates the role of these economic agents in facilitating the realization of gains from trade across
countries in the presence of search frictions. The main lesson from our analysis is that di⁄erent
types of economic integration interact with the entry of intermediaries in distinct ways. When
economic integration leads to the convergence of goods prices across countries, as is the case under
W-integration, intermediaries always magnify the standard gains from trade. By contrast, when
economic integration leads to the entry of foreign intermediaries in local markets, as is the case
under M-integration, their presence can be associated with a country ￿and the world as a whole ￿
incurring welfare losses under further economic integration.37
37In the working paper version of this paper, Antr￿s and Costinot (2010a), we have further shown how these losses
can be circumvented through price controls, tax instruments, and market design. More precisely, losses from M-
integration can be circumvented if: (i) price controls or entry taxes on Northern traders are chosen by the Southern
government in a way that minimizes the margins of Southern traders; and (ii) Southern farmers are assisted in
directing their search towards Northern or Southern traders.
30As mentioned in the introduction, while our model is admittedly stylized, we believe that
the general idea of using dynamic bargaining and matching techniques to model international
transactions could be pursued in several fruitful directions. The previous section has explored some
of them. There are many others. For instance, we have focused on a situation in which only one
intermediary separates farmers from centralized markets. It would be interesting to extend our
framework to allow for multiple layers of intermediation, perhaps by introducing search frictions
between local traders and foreign ones. If materializing the gains from Walrasian market integration
requires the use of additional layers of intermediation, then it becomes less obvious that this type
of integration will always produce magni￿ed gains from trade. Throughout this paper we have also
assumed that farmers are risk neutral. Assuming that farmers are risk averse could complement
some of our results in interesting ways. For instance, one could endogenize the specialization
decision of an individual farmer (instead of simply assuming it, as we have done in our model)
and study how the decision to grow co⁄ee, sugar, or both interacts with search frictions and risk
aversion. In that respect, our predicted increase in intermediation following trade integration could
encourage farmers to specialize their crops according to comparative advantage, thereby producing
additional gains from trade. Last but not least, one could investigate the implication of directed
search in this environment. As discussed in Antr￿s and Costinot (2010a), allowing farmers to direct
their search towards particular traders can alleviate the welfare loss associated with the integration
of matching markets. These are exciting avenues for future research, some of them already under
way; see e.g. Dasgupta and Mondria (2010) and FernÆndez-Blanco (2010).
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31A Proofs
Section 3.3. In the main text we have illustrated the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium by
construction, but we have omitted a few derivations, which we develop below.
Claim 1: At any point in time, the solution of the Nash bargaining problem satis￿es equations (5)-(7).
Let ￿
N denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the Nash bargaining problem. Using equations
(1)-(4), it is clear that the ￿rst-order conditions associated with Nash bargaining are:
￿
￿
V M
Ti ￿ V U
T
￿￿￿1 ￿
V M
Fi ￿ V U
F
￿1￿￿
vC(CTi;STi) = ￿
Np,
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
V M
Ti ￿ V U
T
￿￿ ￿
V M
Fi ￿ V U
F
￿￿￿
vC(CFi;SFi) = ￿
Np,
￿
￿
V M
Ti ￿ V U
T
￿￿￿1 ￿
V M
Fi ￿ V U
F
￿1￿￿
vS(CTi;STi) = ￿
N,
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
V M
Ti ￿ V U
T
￿￿ ￿
V M
Fi ￿ V U
F
￿￿￿
vS(CFi;SFi) = ￿
N,
as well as constraint (7). From these equations, we immediately obtain (6), which ensures by concavity and
homogeneity of degree one that CFi=SFi = CTi=STi as well as vC(CFi;SFi) = vC(CTi;STi) and vS(CFi;SFi) =
vS(CTi;STi). Plugging these equalities in the ￿rst-order conditions we ￿nally obtain equation (5). QED.
Claim 2: At any point in time, ￿ satis￿es equation (17).
Since v is homogeneous of degree one, we know that
v(CF;SF) = (1 ￿ ￿)v (p)
v(CT;ST) = ￿v (p)
Combining the two previous expressions with equations (1)-(4), we obtain
(r + ￿)
￿
V M
F ￿ V U
F
￿
= (1 ￿ ￿)v (p) ￿ ￿F (￿)
￿
V M
F ￿ V U
F
￿
+ _ V M
F ￿ _ V U
F (A1)
[r + ￿ + ￿T (￿)]
￿
V M
T ￿ V U
T
￿
= ￿v (p) + _ V M
T ￿ _ V U
T (A2)
Since equation (5) holds at all points in time, we also know that
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
V M
T ￿ V U
T
￿
= ￿
￿
V M
F ￿ V U
F
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
_ V M
T ￿ _ V U
T
￿
= ￿
￿
_ V M
F ￿ _ V U
F
￿
Multiplying equation (A1) by ￿ and equation (A2) by (1 ￿ ￿) and subtracting, we get
￿ = ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
V M
T ￿ V U
T
￿
[￿F (￿) ￿ ￿T (￿)]
v (p)
Equation (17) derives from the previous expression and equations (10) and (18). QED.
Claim 3: At any point in time, ￿ is the unique solution of equation (20), i.e.,
v (p) ￿ ￿
￿
=
r + ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
￿￿T (￿)
￿ ￿(￿).
It is immediate that ￿(￿) is continuous and strictly increasing in ￿. We next note that lim￿!0 ￿T (￿) = +1
and lim￿!+1 ￿F (￿) = +1 imply lim￿!0 ￿(￿) = 0 and lim￿!+1 ￿(￿) = +1. By the intermediate value
32theorem, these two boundary conditions and ￿0 (￿) > 0 guarantee the existence of a unique ￿ satisfying
equation (20). QED.
Claim 4: In steady state, NT is strictly increasing in ￿.
From equation (25), we have
NT =
￿￿ + ￿F (￿)
￿ + ￿F (￿)
NF ￿ ￿ (￿)NF, (A3)
We need to show that ￿
0 (￿) > 0. Di⁄erentiating ￿ (￿), we obtain
￿
0 (￿) =
[￿ + ￿0
F (￿)]￿ + ￿￿F (￿)
h
1 ￿
￿￿
0
F(￿)
￿F(￿)
i
[￿ + ￿F (￿)]
2 > 0,
where the inequality follows from ￿0
F (￿) > 0 and ￿￿0
F (￿)=￿F (￿) < 1 since ￿F (￿)=￿ is decreasing in ￿.
QED.
Section 4.3. In the main text we have argued that if the elasticity "(￿) ￿ dlnm(uF;uT)/dlnuT is non-
increasing in the level of intermediation, ￿, then, ceteris paribus, islands with lower levels of intermediation
will grow faster after W-integration. We now establish this result formally.
Let us denote by NA the steady state number of matched farmer-trader pairs in the South under autarky.
Since the relative price of co⁄ee is p = aC=aS, real GDP in the South under autarky, Y A, is given by
Y A = NA=aS
Similarly, if NW denotes the steady state number of matched farmer-trader pairs in the South under W-
integration, real GDP under W-integration, Y W, is given by
Y W = (a￿
C=a￿
S)NW=aC
The two previous equations imply that the growth rate in real GDP between the autarky and W-integration
steady states, Y W=Y A, is proportional to the growth rate in the number of matches, NW=NA. In order to
establish that W-integration leads to convergence, we therefore need to show that NW=NA is decreasing in
￿.
To do so, we denote by N(v) the number of matches in equilibrium when the utility associated with
a matched farmer trader pair is equal to v in the South. With these notations, we have NW=NA =
N(vW)=N(vA), where vW ￿ v
￿
pW￿
and vA ￿ v (p). Hence, showing that NW=NA is decreasing in ￿ is
equivalent to showing that dlnN/dlnv is decreasing in ￿, which we now demonstrate. In steady state, we
know by equation (23) that N(v) = (￿F (￿)NF)/[￿ + ￿F (￿)]. This implies
dlnN
dlnv
=
￿
￿
￿ + ￿F (￿)
￿￿
dln￿F (￿)
dlnv
￿
, (A4)
which can be rearranged as
dlnN
dlnv
=
￿
￿"(￿)
￿ + ￿F (￿)
￿￿
dln￿
dlnv
￿
.
33Using equation (20), it is easy to check that
dln￿
dlnv
=
(r + ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
(r + ￿)[1 ￿ "(￿)] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
+
￿￿T (￿)
(r + ￿)[1 ￿ "(￿)] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
. (A5)
Since "(￿) and ￿T (￿) are non-increasing in ￿ and ￿F (￿) is increasing in ￿, equation (A5) implies that
@ ln￿/@ lnv is decreasing in ￿. Combining this observation with equation (A4), we obtain that @ lnN/@ lnv
is decreasing in ￿.
Finally, note that if the matching function is CES, m(uF;uT) ￿
h
(AFuF)
￿￿1
￿ + (ATuT)
￿￿1
￿
i ￿
￿￿1
with
￿ 2 [0;1], then
"(￿) =
(AT￿)
￿￿1
￿
(AF)
￿￿1
￿ + (AT￿)
￿￿1
￿
,
which is non-increasing in ￿ for ￿ 2 [0;1], as argued in the main text. QED.
Section 4.4. In the main text we have argued that if islands are completely specialized under W-integration,
then: (i) the values of ￿
W and
￿
￿
W
￿￿
are greater than their autarky levels, ￿ and ￿
￿, at any point in time;
and: (ii) the value functions of all agents are also greater than their autarky levels at any point in time. We
now demonstrate these two results formally.
Without loss of generality, we focus on the Southern island. We assume that W-integration occurs at some
date t0. For notational convenience, we still denote by pW and ￿
W the world price and the intermediation
level, respectively, but it should be clear that they now are functions of t. Our proof proceeds in four steps.
Step 1: For all t ￿ t0, the indirect utility of a matched farmer-trader pair in the South satis￿es v(pW) ￿ v(p).
This directly derives from the fact that, like in a standard Ricardian model, a change in the relative
price of co⁄ee necessarily expands the ￿budget set￿of a farmer-trader match.
Step 2: For all t ￿ t0, the intermediation level in the South satis￿es ￿
W ￿ ￿.
By the same argument as in Section 3.3, the value function of matched traders in the South under
W-integration must satisfy
V M
T = ￿=￿T
￿
￿
W
￿
,
_ V M
T = (r + ￿)V M
T + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
V M
T
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿
￿
.
Combining the two previous expressions, we obtain
_ zW = f
￿
zW￿
+ g
￿
pW￿
, (A6)
where
zW ￿ 1=￿T
￿
￿
W
￿
;
f
￿
zW￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
￿zW￿
+ (r + ￿)zW;
g
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿
￿
v(pW)
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
.
Notice that, by de￿nition of ￿T
￿
￿
W
￿
, zW is a strictly increasing function of ￿
W, and thus, f is a strictly
increasing function of zW. Notice also that g
￿
pW￿
￿ g (p) by Step 1.
34The rest of our proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that there exists t1 ￿ t0 such that ￿
W < ￿.
Thus there exists t1 ￿ t0 such that zW (t1) < z with z such that 0 = f (z) + g (p). Since f is increasing
in zW and g
￿
pW￿
￿ g (p), we get _ zW (t1) = f
￿
zW (t1)
￿
+ g
￿
pW (t1)
￿
￿ f
￿
zW (t1)
￿
+ g (p) < 0 at t1. This
implies _ zW (t) < f
￿
zW (t1)
￿
+ g (p) < 0 for all t > t1. (To see this note that if there was a date t2 > t1
such that _ zW ￿ f
￿
zW (t1)
￿
+ g (p), then there would also exist, by continuity, a date tc 2 (t1;t2) such that
_ zW (tc) = f
￿
zW (t1)
￿
+ g (p) and _ z (t) < 0 for all t 2 (t1;tc). By equation (A6), we would therefore have
f
￿
zW(tc)
￿
+g
￿
pW (tc)
￿
= f
￿
zW (t1)
￿
+g (p). Since f is increasing in zW and g
￿
pW (tc)
￿
￿ g (p), this implies
zW (tc) > zW (t1), which contradicts _ z (t) < 0 for all t 2 (t1;tc).) This further implies zW (t) ! ￿1, which
cannot be an equilibrium.
Step 3: All traders are necessarily better o⁄ under W-integration.
For unmatched traders, this directly derives from free entry. For matched traders, this derives from
equation (18) and the fact that ￿T
￿
￿
W
￿
￿ ￿T (￿) by Step 2.
Step 4: All farmers are necessarily better o⁄ under W-integration.
The Bellman equations associated with the farmers￿value functions are still given by equations (1) and
(2). Using equation (17), they can be rearranged as
rV U
F = ￿F
￿
￿
W
￿￿
V M
F ￿ V U
F
￿
+ _ V U
F ,
rV M
F = h
￿
￿
W
￿
+ ￿
￿
V U
F ￿ V M
F
￿
+ _ V M
F ,
where h
￿
￿
W
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)v(pW)+(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿
W ￿ 1
￿
￿. Combining the two previous expressions with equations
(5), (10) and (18), we obtain
_ V U
F = rV U
F ￿ ￿
W￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿
, (A7)
_ V M
F = (r + ￿)V M
F ￿ h
￿
￿
W
￿
￿ ￿V U
F . (A8)
By Step 2, we know that ￿
W ￿ ￿. Using equation (A7) and the same logic as in Step 2, we can therefore
conclude that V U
F ￿
￿
V U
F
￿A
for all t ￿ t0, where
￿
V U
F
￿A
denotes the value function of an unmatched farmer
under autarky. By Steps 1 and 2, we also know that h
￿
￿
W
￿
￿ h(￿). Using this observation with the fact
that V U
F ￿
￿
V U
F
￿A
for all t ￿ t0 and equation (A8), the same logic as in Step 2 implies V M
F ￿
￿
V M
F
￿A
for all
t ￿ t0, where
￿
V M
F
￿A
denotes the value function of a matched farmer under autarky.
Proof of Lemma 1. Without loss of generality, we focus on the Southern island. For the same reasons as
in section 3.3, we must have V M
F i
C
= V M
F i
S
￿ V M
F i and V M
T i
C
= V M
T i
S
￿ V M
T i , where V M
F i denotes the value function
of a Southern farmer matched with a trader from island i = N;S and V M
T i denotes the value function of a
trader from island i matched with a Southern farmer. Let uT N and uT S denote the measures of unmatched
Northern and Southern traders, respectively, searching for matches in the South. If ￿ ￿ uT N/[uT N + uT S]
denotes the fraction of unmatched Northern traders in the Southern island, the value functions of all agents
35can then be expressed as
rV U
F = ￿F
￿
￿
N
￿￿
￿ max
￿N2f0;1g
h
(1 ￿ ￿
N)
￿
V M
F N ￿ V U
F
￿i
+ (1 ￿ ￿) max
￿S2f0;1g
h
(1 ￿ ￿
S)
￿
V M
F S ￿ V U
F
￿i￿
+ _ V U
F , (A9)
rV M
F i =
￿
1 ￿ ￿i￿
v
￿
pW￿
+ ￿
￿
V U
F ￿ V M
F i
￿
+ _ V M
F i , (A10)
rV U
T i = max
h
￿￿i + ￿T
￿
￿
N
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
i￿￿
V M
T i ￿ V U
T i
￿
;0
i
+ _ V U
T i, (A11)
rV M
T i = ￿iv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿i + ￿
￿
V U
T i ￿ V M
T i
￿
+ _ V M
T i , (A12)
where ￿
N denotes the level of intermediation after M-integration; and ￿i denotes the share of consumption
accruing to traders from island i, ￿S ￿ ￿, and ￿N ￿ ￿￿. The max operator in equations (A9) and (A11)
re￿ ects the fact that, on the one hand, a farmer matched with a trader from island i may now prefer to keep
searching for a trader from the other island, and on the other hand, traders from island i may at any point in
time go back to their hammocks. In this environment, ￿
i = 1 if Southern farmers break their matches with
traders from island i and ￿
i = 0 if they don￿ t. It should be clear that all functions in equations (A9)-(A12),
including ￿
N, ￿
i, ￿, and v
￿
pW￿
, may a priori vary over time. Finally, note that free entry requires V U
T i ￿ 0
for i = N;S. Combining this inequality with equation (A11), we obtain
V U
T i = _ V U
T i = 0, (A13)
at all points in time. The rest of our proof proceeds in three steps.
Step 1: For all t ￿ t0, we must have ￿
N ￿ ￿
S.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a date t such that ￿
S < ￿
N. Then, it must
be the case that ￿
S = 0 and ￿
N = 1. By equation (A9), we must therefore have V M
F S ￿ V U
F ￿ 0 and
V M
F N ￿ V U
F ￿ 0. Combining this observation with Nash Bargaining, we further get V M
F S + V M
T S ￿ V U
F + V U
T S
and V M
F N + V M
T N ￿ V U
F + V U
T N. By equation (A13), we know that V U
T S = V U
T N = 0. Thus
V M
F S + V M
T S ￿ V M
F N + V M
T N. (A14)
Using equations (A10) and (A12), it is easy to check that
￿
_ V M
F S + _ V M
T S ￿ _ V M
F N ￿ _ V M
T N
￿
= ￿ ￿ ￿￿ + (r + ￿)
￿
V M
F S + V M
T S ￿ V M
F N ￿ V M
T N
￿
which admits a unique stable solution
V M
F S + V M
T S ￿ V M
F N ￿ V M
T N =
￿￿ ￿ ￿
r + ￿
< 0,
which contradicts inequality (A14).
Step 2: For all t > t0, the pay-o⁄ of matched Northern traders is higher than the pay-o⁄ of matched
Southern traders: ￿Nv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿ > ￿Sv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿.
We consider three separate cases.
Case 1: ￿(t) 2 (0;1).
If ￿(t) 2 (0;1), then traders from both islands are actively searching for Southern farmers at date t.
Thus we must have ￿
i = 0 for i = N;S. Otherwise traders form island i would be better o⁄ staying in their
36hammocks by equations (A11). Accordingly, we can rearrange equations (A9) and (A11) as
rV U
F = ￿F
￿
￿
N
￿￿
￿
￿
V M
F N ￿ V U
F
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
V M
F S ￿ V U
F
￿￿
+ _ V U
F . (A16)
and
rV U
T i = ￿￿i + ￿T
￿
￿
N
￿￿
V M
T i ￿ V U
T i
￿
+ _ V U
T i. (A15)
Combining equations (A15) and (A12), we obtain
h
r + ￿ + ￿T
￿
￿
N
￿i￿
V M
T i ￿ V U
T i
￿
= ￿iv
￿
pW￿
+ _ V M
T i ￿ _ V U
T i. (A17)
Similarly, combining equations (A10) and (A16), we get
(r + ￿)
￿
V M
F i ￿ V U
F
￿
=
￿
1 ￿ ￿i￿
v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿F
￿
￿
N
￿￿
￿
￿
V M
F N ￿ V U
F
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
V M
F S ￿ V U
F
￿￿
+ _ V M
F i ￿ _ V U
F .
(A18)
At any date t > t0, we know that Nash bargaining implies
￿
1 ￿ ￿
i￿￿
V M
T i ￿ V U
T i
￿
= ￿
i ￿
V M
F i ￿ V U
F
￿
,
as well as
￿
1 ￿ ￿
i￿￿
_ V M
T i ￿ _ V U
T i
￿
= ￿
i
￿
_ V M
F i ￿ _ V U
F
￿
,
where ￿
S ￿ ￿ and ￿
N ￿ ￿ ￿. Multiplying equation (A17) by
￿
1 ￿ ￿
i￿
and equation (A18) by ￿
i and
subtracting, we get
￿i = ￿
i +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
i￿n
￿T
￿
￿
N
￿￿
V M
T i ￿ V U
T i
￿
￿ ￿F
￿
￿
N
￿￿
￿
￿
V M
T N ￿ V U
T
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
V M
T S ￿ V U
T
￿￿o
v (pW)
.
Using the previous expression and equation (A13), we obtain
￿i = ￿
i +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
i￿h
￿T
￿
￿
N
￿
V M
T i ￿ ￿F
￿
￿
N
￿￿
￿V M
T N + (1 ￿ ￿)V M
T S
￿i
v (pW)
. (A19)
Equations (A13) and (A15) further imply
V M
T i =
￿i
￿T
￿
￿
N
￿. (A20)
Combining equations (A19) and (A20), we get
￿iv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿i = ￿
i ￿
v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿i￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
i￿
￿
N￿ ￿,
where ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿. Since ￿ ￿ > ￿, ￿￿ < ￿, v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿ > 0, and v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿ > 0, the previous
expression implies
￿
￿Nv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿￿
￿
￿
￿Sv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿
￿
> 0.
Case 2: ￿(t) = 0.
If ￿(t) = 0, then only Southern traders are searching for Southern farmers at date t. Thus we must have
37￿
S = 0. Following the exact same logic as in Case 1 for Southern traders only, we get
￿Sv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿ = ￿
￿
v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿
N￿
￿
. (A21)
What about matched Northern traders (if there are any)? Using our free entry condition, equation (A13),
we can rearrange equation (A12) as
(r + ￿)
￿
V M
T N ￿ V U
T N
￿
= ￿Nv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿ + _ V M
T N ￿ _ V U
T N. (A22)
By equations (A9) and (A10), we also know that
(r + ￿)
￿
V M
F N ￿ V U
F
￿
=
￿
1 ￿ ￿N￿
v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿F
￿
￿
N
￿￿
V M
F S ￿ V U
F
￿
+ _ V M
F N ￿ _ V U
F , (A23)
Using our Nash bargaining conditions with equations (A22) and (A23), we obtain
￿Nv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿ = ￿ ￿
￿
v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿F
￿
￿
N
￿￿
V M
T S ￿ V U
T
￿
.
Because of free entry of the Southern traders, we know by equation (A11) that V M
T S = ￿=￿T
￿
￿
N
￿
. Thus we
get
￿Nv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿ = ￿ ￿
￿
v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
N￿
￿
. (A24)
Since Southern traders are searching for Northern farmers, we know that v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿ ￿
(1￿￿)
￿ ￿
N￿ > 0.
Combining this observation with equations (A21) and (A24) and the fact that ￿ ￿ > ￿ and ￿￿ < ￿, with at
least one strict inequality, we obtain
￿
￿Nv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿￿
￿
￿
￿Sv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿
￿
> 0.
Case 3: ￿(t) = 1.
The exact same logic as in case 2 implies
￿Nv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿ = ￿ ￿
￿
v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
N￿￿
and
￿Sv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿ = ￿
￿
v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
N￿￿,
which again implies
￿
￿Nv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿￿
￿
￿
￿Sv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿
￿
> 0. This completes the proof of Step 2.
Step 3: For almost all t > t0, we must have ￿(t) = 1.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist t1 < t2 such that an arbitrary trader from the
Southern island is active in the Southern island for all t 2 (t1;t2). By de￿nition, we know that
V U
T S (t) = E
￿Z +1
t
e￿rt
0
[v [CT S (t0);ST S (t0)] ￿ IAS (t0)￿]dt0
￿
.
Let IMS (t0) denote the indicator variable which is equal to one if the trader from the Southern island is
matched at date t0 and zero otherwise. With this notation, we can rearrange the previous expression as
V U
T S (t) =
Z +1
t
e￿rt
0
E
￿
IA (t0)
￿
IMS (t0)￿Sv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿
￿￿
dt0. (A25)
38Now consider an arbitrary trader from the Northern island. Suppose that this trader follows the exact
same strategy as the trader from the Southern island, i.e. he would choose to be active or inactive at
the exact same dates (conditional on the same history). Let IMN (t0) denote the indicator variable which
is equal to one if the trader from the Northern island is matched at date t0 and zero otherwise By Step
1, we know that ￿
N ￿ ￿
S, which implies PrfIMN (t0) = 1g ￿ PrfIMS (t0) = 1g for all t0. By Step 2, we
also know that ￿Nv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿￿ > ￿Sv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿. Thus, if we denote by Zi (t0) ￿ IMi (t0)￿iv
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿i,
ZN (t0) strictly ￿rst-order stochastically dominates ZS (t0) for all t0. Since IA (t0) = 1 for all t 2 (t1;t2),
this implies that IAS (t0)ZN (t0) strictly ￿rst-order stochastically dominates IAS (t0)ZS (t0), and therefore,
that E
￿
IAS (t0)ZN (t0)
￿
> E
￿
IAS (t0)ZS (t0)
￿
. Combining this observation with equation (A25), we obtain
V U
T N (t) > V U
T S (t), where V U
T N (t) is the expected lifetime utility of the Northern trader. By equation (A13),
we know that V U
T S (t) = V U
T N (t) = 0, a contradiction. QED.
Section 5.3. In the main text, we have argued that: (i) if ￿ > ￿￿ and ￿ ￿ = ￿, then ￿N < ￿W; and (ii) if
￿ = ￿￿ and ￿ ￿ > ￿, then ￿N > ￿W. To verify these claims, note that we can combine equations (36) and
(37) to express ￿N in the following two ways:
￿N = ￿ ￿
2
4
r + ￿ + ￿T
￿
￿
N
￿
r + ￿ +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿F
￿
￿
N
￿
+ ￿￿T
￿
￿
N
￿
3
5;
￿N =
￿￿
v (pW)
2
4
r + ￿ + ￿T
￿
￿
N
￿
￿T
￿
￿
N
￿
3
5.
Because the right-hand-side of the ￿rst equation is decreasing in ￿
N, we can conclude that, for ￿ = ￿, we
must have ￿N < ￿W, where ￿W is de￿ned in (28). On the other hand, the right-hand-side of the second
equation is increasing in ￿
N. Inspection of the equation indicates that, for ￿ = ￿￿, the larger level of ￿
N
induced by ￿ > ￿ necessarily translates into a value of ￿N that is larger than in the absence of M-integration
(that is, ￿N > ￿W). QED.
Section 5.4. In the next main text, we have argued that social welfare is increasing in ￿ if and only if
￿ ￿ " ￿ dlnm(uF;uT)/dlnuT. We now establish this result formally. For expositional purposes, we focus
on the autarky case. The other cases are similar.
By equation (29), we know that social welfare is given by
W (t) = V U
F (t)
￿
uF (t) +
￿[NF ￿ uF (t)]
r + ￿
￿
+
￿
v
￿
pW￿
￿ ￿
￿￿
NF ￿ uF (t)
r + ￿
￿
.
Since uF (t) is predetermined at date t and v
￿
pW￿
is independent of ￿, this implies
dW (t)
d￿
= Z (t) ￿
dV U
F (t)
d￿
, (A26)
where Z (t) ￿ uF (t) +
￿[NF￿uF(t)]
r+￿ > 0. By equations (20), and (21), we know that
V U
F =
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
r￿
.
39Di⁄erentiating the previous expression, we obtain
dV U
F (t)
d￿
=
￿￿
r￿
2
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
dln￿
dln￿
￿ 1
￿
. (A27)
By directly di⁄erentiating equation (20), it is easy to check that
dln￿
dln￿
=
r + ￿ + ￿F (￿)
(r + ￿)(1 ￿ ") + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
, (A28)
where (r + ￿)(1 ￿ ") + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿) > 0 since ￿ is increasing in ￿. Combining equations (A27) and (A28),
we obtain
dV U
F (t)
d￿
=
￿￿
r￿
2
￿
(r + ￿)(" ￿ ￿)
(r + ￿)(1 ￿ ") + (1 ￿ ￿)￿F (￿)
￿
. (A29)
Equations (A26) and (A29) imply that W (t) is increasing in ￿ if and only if ￿ ￿ ". QED
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